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as my little sister.
Finally, I would like to thank Nathalie and Diego. Nathalie, during my entire
PhD you supported me in many di¤erent ways. You distracted me from my research
when needed, and allowed me to talk to myself or stare to the ceiling for hours
when needed. You also helped me placing my job as a researcher in perspective
and broadened my horizon in many ways. Without you the process of writing a
PhD thesis would not have been nearly this smooth. I hope you know how much I
appreciate everything that you do, although I may not say that often enough.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Economists study human behavior. In order to learn about human behavior, re-
searchers often examine what people are actually doing. However, many of the
things that people do, stem from their motivation to do so. Hence, in order to un-
derstand behavior, economists have studied peoplesmotivations as well. Motivation
can be grouped into roughly two categories, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
For decades economists have primarily focused on understanding extrinsic mo-
tivation. Extrinsic motivation is dened by Ryan and Deci (2000) as "a construct
that pertains whenever an activity is done in order to attain some separable out-
come" (p. 60). Separable outcomes in this denition include: being paid for ones
performance, but also avoiding sanctions, or improving career perspectives. Empir-
ical studies found that many people are motivated by extrinsic incentives (see most
notably Lazear 2000).
More recently, economists have become interested in the implications of intrinsic
motivation. Ryan and Deci (2000) dene intrinsic motivation as "doing of an activity
for its inherent satisfactions rather than for some separable consequence" (p. 56).
Many papers have studied intrinsic motivation, often in the form of altruism. For
instance, the role of intrinsic motivation in self-selection into jobs and performance
on the job (see e.g. Besley and Ghatak 2005, Prendergast 2007, and Delfgaauw
and Dur 2007), as well as the role of altruistic preferences in the decision to make
donations to charitable organizations (see e.g. Andreoni 1989, 1990).
This thesis focuses on intrinsic motivation. In the second chapter I describe the
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results of a eld experiment I ran together with my co-author Michiel Souverijn.
In that chapter we examine the e¤ects of motivating students to set goals on their
study performance. In particular we study whether encouraging university students
to set a grade goal, and further motivating them to set a more ambitious grade goal,
has an e¤ect on their study performance and drop out. In our setting, goals are not
combined with any extrinsic rewards or punishments. Hence the e¤ects from goal
setting on performance stem from studentsintrinsic motivation to achieve the goal.
The third chapter which is joint work with my advisor Robert Dur and the fourth
chapter which is single authored focus on workersmotivations to help others. There
are several ways in which people can help others. Two prominent ways are: i) by
helping others through exerting e¤ort on the job and ii) by making contributions to
a charitable organization. We study the relation between helping others by exerting
on-the-job e¤ort and helping others outside the workplace in the form of donating
money and time (i.e. volunteering).
The remainder of this introduction is organized as follows. In the next two
sections I discuss the concept of goal setting, and the literature on helping others
on the job and outside the workplace. In the nal section, I give an overview of the
chapters.
1.1 Goal setting
Setting goals is a frequently observed phenomenon. For instance, many people set
themselves goals. Famous examples of self-set goals are: a minimum number of kilos
that someone who is on a diet wants to lose, or a maximum number of cigarettes one
wants to smoke, or alcoholic beverages that one wants to consume. Besides people
setting goals for themselves, we also observe goals being set by other people. For
example, employers set goals for their employees during appraisal interviews, often
in the form of targets. However with many of these goals there is no extrinsic reward
or punishment for reaching or not reaching the goal. Hence, in order for goals to be
successful, it must be the case that people are intrinsically motivated to reach their
goals and therefore are willing to set goals in the rst place.
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There is an extensive literature on goal setting, starting with the seminal paper
by psychologists Locke and Latham in 1979. Locke and Latham were the rst to
analyze the e¤ects of goal setting using a series of eld experiments. They distinguish
between three types of goals: self-set goals, goals set in cooperation, and goals set
by other people. They found that goal setting can increase performance in various
tasks for all three types of goals.
Furthermore there is a large literature in psychology analyzing what the key
elements are that make goals e¤ective. Psychologists have found that goals should
be formulated SMART, i.e. specic, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time
bound (see Doran 1981) and that goals should be challenging, but still attainable
(Locke et al. 1981).
More recently economists and management scientists have studied goal setting.
Economic theory papers have shown that goals can function as reference points in
order to increase performance for people who are loss averse or present biased, or
that meeting goals can lead to a sense of self-achievement that makes pursuing goals
worthwhile (see e.g. Suvorov and Van de Ven 2008, Hsiaw 2013, Koch and Nafziger
2011, Gomez-Minambres 2012, and Koch et al. 2014).
An increasing body of empirical literature in economics and management science
tests the e¤ects of goal setting. Some papers test the e¤ects of goals on performance
when goals are combined with monetary incentives. The monetary incentive is often
a bonus that is received when the goal is reached. Other papers study the e¤ects of
goals without monetary incentives. The general nding in this literature is that goals
can help to increase performance and especially so if goals are combined with mon-
etary incentives. The fact that setting goals can increase performance (as compared
to not setting goals), even without combining the goal with monetary incentives, is
an indication that people intrinsically value reaching goals, and are therefore willing
to set goals in the rst place. The nding that goal setting increases performance
holds when people set themselves goals as well as when the goals are set by other
people, for example by a manager or a peer.
In chapter two we study whether goal setting can increase studentsperformance
in an academic course. In addition we test whether motivating students to increase
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the di¢ culty of the goal can increase performance further.
1.2 Intrinsic motivation to help others
In chapter three and four we analyze the relationship between workersaltruistic
preferences, their occupational choice, and their opportunities to help other people
on the job, and outside the workplace. In this section we rst report some evidence
showing that helping people on the job and outside the workplace are frequently
observed behaviors, and that the extent to which one has opportunities to help
others at work di¤ers between job types. Next I provide evidence that intrinsic
motivation, often studied in the form of altruism, is an important driver of helping
behavior on the job as well as outside the workplace.
Evidence from the International Social Survey indicates that many people nd it
important to have a job that allows them to help others, and many people also claim
to have such a job. As typical examples of such jobs, one naturally thinks of nurses
who help their patients to recover from an illness, or teachers that help children
to learn how to read and write. However one can also think of helping others in a
broader sense. For example, environmentalists who work for an organization that
helps save the planet from global warming or prevent a particular animal species from
extinction, or bureaucrats who make policies that improve the lifes of the poor. In
contrast to these "public service jobs" there are job types that are generally believed
to o¤er less opportunities to help others. Well known examples are investment
bankers or bookkeepers at for prot organizations.
Helping others outside the workplace by making charitable donations is also fre-
quently observed. Using data from the European Value Survey, Bauer et al. (2013)
report that in European countries around 18% of the people perform voluntary work,
and 27% donates money to non-prot organizations, although these numbers widely
vary by country. Further, List and Price (2012) found that in rich countries typically
a majority of people make some donations to charitable organizations.
There is a rich literature that tries to explain peoplesmotives for charitable
giving. One obvious reason to make a donation is because the donor cares about
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the recipientswell-being. However, there are many other alternative reasons. One
may have strategic reasons to help others through taking a job as a volunteer, for
instance in order to enhance ones career. But also because of image concerns or
social pressure (see e.g. DellaVigna et al. 2012).
There is plenty of evidence showing that charitable giving is (at least partly)
driven by peoplesaltruistic preferences. For instance, using a laboratory experiment
where things like image concerns or reputational concerns are absent, Andreoni and
Miller (2002) found that a majority of people are willing to spend some money
(anonymously) in order to help others.
1.3 Overview of the chapters
In chapter two we study the e¤ects of motivating students to set a grade goal on
study performance. We are interested to learn whether goal setting can increase
student performance, and whether challenging students to be more ambitious by
motivating them to set more di¢ cult goals, can increase study performance further.
In order to test our predictions we conducted a eld experiment.
Our eld experiment involved almost 1100 rst-year economics students at Eras-
mus University Rotterdam. Each of these rst-year students regularly has individual
meetings with a mentor. Mentors are senior students who are randomly assigned to
students. Mentors help their students to get used to studying at a university, teach
them study skills, help them with their study motivation, monitor their performance,
and give suggestions in order to increase their study performance.
Our experiment involves the second of three individual meetings between stu-
dents and their mentor. In one treatment (goal treatment) we instructed mentors to
ask their students whether they had a specic grade goal in mind for the main course
they participated in at that moment, and if not, whether they wanted to set a grade
goal. The second treatment, the raise treatment builds upon the goal treatment. In
the raise treatment mentors received identical instructions as in the goal treatment,
but were in addition instructed to encourage students to raise their goal if deemed
appropriate. We subsequently measured study performance using the grades that
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the students obtained.
We predict that motivating students to set goals increases their performance.
Having their mentor propose a more ambitious goal can, but need not, increase per-
formance further. To be precise, a proposal to raise the goal increases performance
when there is a cost of rejecting the proposal to raise (for example in the form of a
psychological cost) and if the proposed raise is not too large. However, increasing
the goal too much leads students to give up on their goal, in which case performance
will be similar to the performance of a student who did not set a goal. Finally,
performance is expected to be the same as without the proposal to raise if rejecting
the proposed new goal is not so costly, and the alternative is the goal the student
initially set.
We nd that students whose mentor was instructed to motivate his students to
set a grade goal perform 0.16 better on a 10-point scale (which is 9.3% of a standard
deviation) than students in the control group. Sanders and Chonaire (2015) nd by
studying over 100 randomized controlled trials in education that the median e¤ect
size of an intervention is 0.1 of a standard deviation. Considering that our interven-
tion is (almost) costless, the e¤ect size we nd is economically signicant. We nd
that the e¤ect in our study is mainly driven by students in the goal treatment drop-
ping out less often than students in the control group. Students whose mentor was
instructed to also motivate students to raise their goal do not perform signicantly
di¤erent from the control group. Finally, being asked to raise the goal in the raise
treatment leads to a signicant drop in performance as compared to similar students
in the goal treatment.
There are multiple potential explanations for why challenging students to set
more ambitious goals has a negative e¤ect on performance. First, the raise proposed
by the mentor may be too large, and hence students give up trying to reach their goal,
leading to a performance similar to the control group. Alternatively, the proposal to
raise the goal may lead to a decrease in motivation to reach the goal, and therefore
studentsperformance decreased. This is in line with the psychology literature, that
nds that often people are more motivated to reach self-set goals, than goals that
are set by others or are set in cooperation.
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In chapter three we examine the role of intrinsic motivation (in the form of altru-
istic preferences) in occupational choice, on-the-job e¤ort provision, and charitable
donations. We start by developing a theoretical model in which workers di¤er in
their altruistic preferences. Altruistic workers receive utility from helping others,
and are able to help others in two distinct ways i) by taking a public service job and
exerting e¤ort on the job and ii) by making a donation to a charitable organization.
In our model workers make three decisions. First they choose whether to take a
public service job or a regular job. Next they choose how much e¤ort to exert at
work and how much of their income to donate to charity.
From our theoretical model we derive the following testable predictions. First, the
probability that a worker has a public service job (weakly) increases in the workers
altruism. Having a public service job provides the worker with opportunities to
contribute to the well-being of others. This job feature is appreciated by altruistic
workers, and hence these are the type of workers who self-select into public service
jobs. Second, for a given job type, charitable donations (weakly) increase in workers
altruism. Third, given workersaltruism and income, workers who have a public
service job donate less to charity than workers who have a regular job. The intuition
behind this nal result is that public service workers already contribute to the well-
being of others by exerting e¤ort on-the-job and, hence, by a substitution argument,
they will donate less.
We empirically examine our predictions using data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (SOEP). The SOEP is a representative longitudinal study
covering 30,000 persons in 11,000 households. It contains questions about individu-
alseducation, earnings, employment, personality characteristics, and behavior. The
key variables that we use for our analysis are self-reported altruism, money donations
to charity, and job type or sector of employment.
Using data from the German SOEP we nd some evidence for our predictions.
In line with our theory, we nd that workers who are more altruistic are more
likely to take a public service job and, for a given job type, donate more money to
charity. Furthermore, we nd that workers in a regular job make signicantly higher
donations to charity than equally altruistic workers in a public service job. However,
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this di¤erence moves close to zero and becomes statistically insignicant when we
control for income.
In the fourth chapter we explore the relationship between workersopportunities
to help others on the job and volunteering behavior outside the workplace further.
Based on the theoretical framework developed in Dur and van Lent (2016), i.e. based
on the third chapter, we predict that helping people on the job and volunteering
time outside the workplace are substitutes. We test this prediction by exploiting
two sources of variation in workersopportunities to help others at work over time,
and measure the e¤ect of this change on volunteering behavior outside work. We test
our prediction using rich panel data from the Dutch Longitudinal Internet Studies
for the Social sciences (LISS) Panel.
The LISS Panel consists of approximately 8,000 individuals and covers the years
2008 to 2016. The questionnaire contains detailed questions on leasure, work, school-
ing, personality, and politics, which allow us to test our prediction. The key question
we use as a proxy for charitable behavior is "Considered all together, how much time
do you spend on voluntary work per week, on average".
First, as a change in the ability to help others on-the-job, we study the e¤ect of
changes in sector of employment on volunteering. We expect, following our theory,
that workers who switch from a private sector job to a public sector job decrease
their time spent volunteering, while we expect the opposite for workers who make a
job switch in the other direction. Second, we rely on a plausibly exogenous change in
workersability to help others on the job by studying changes in the match of mission
preferences of government workers with their employer. Workers are assumed to have
a mission match when they voted for one of the political parties that is in o¢ ce.
The preferences are classied as a mismatch if the worker has voted for a political
party that is not in o¢ ce. We expect that government workers who have a mission
match with their employer feel that they have more opportunities to help others at
work than government workers who voted for a political party that is not in o¢ ce.
We have data covering three government coalition periods, and hence observe two
changes in the composition of the parties that are in o¢ ce.
We nd that workers who switch from sector of employment, do not change their
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time spent on voluntary work signicantly, although the coe¢ cients always have the
expected sign. That is, workers who switch from a private sector job to a public
sector job (insignicantly) decrease their time spent volunteering. Further, govern-
ment workers who voted for one of the political parties that is in o¢ ce, decrease
their volunteering by 15 minutes per week on average as compared to when they
voted for a party that was not in o¢ ce, which is in line with our theory.

Chapter 2
Goal Setting and Raising the Bar:
A Field Experiment
Joint with Michiel Souverijn
2.1 Introduction
People often set goals. For example dieters commonly set a target weight, runners
aim for a certain time, and managers set goals for employees in the form of targets.
Using a series of eld experiments, the psychologists Locke and Latham (1979)
were the rst to provide evidence that goals help to increase performance.1 More
recently, goal setting has also been studied by management scientists and economists.
Economic theory papers have shown how goals can be used as reference points in
order to increase performance for loss averse agents or hyperbolic discounters (see
e.g. Suvorov and Van de Ven 2008, Hsiaw 2013, Koch and Nafziger 2011, and Koch et
al. 2014), and that meeting goals can lead to a sense of self-achievement that makes
pursuing goals worthwhile (Gomez-Minambres 2012). A rapidly growing empirical
literature tests the e¤ects of goal setting on performance in the laboratory and in
the eld.
1Locke and Latham found that goals set by an outsider (a peer or a manager), goals set in
cooperation, and self-set goals can all lead to a better performance as compared to not setting
goals.
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This paper examines whether goal setting can help to increase student perfor-
mance and to decrease drop out in an academic course. Furthermore, we are inter-
ested to learn whether challenging students to be more ambitious by increasing the
goals di¢ culty can increase performance further. This is relevant given the widely
held belief that many students should be more ambitious, and the recently increased
focus on student performance in higher education.
We start by developing a simple theory which explains how and when setting
a goal and increasing a goals di¢ culty can increase performance. We derive the
following predictions. In line with the literature, people are willing to set a goal
since setting a goal increases both performance and utility. Having an outsider
propose a more ambitious goal can, but need not, increase performance further. To
be precise, a proposal to raise the goal increases performance when there is a cost of
rejecting the proposal to raise and if the raise is not too large.2 Performance will be
the same as without the proposal to raise if rejecting the raise is not so costly, and
the alternative is the goal initially set. Finally, increasing the goal too much might
lead students to give up on their goal, in which case performance will be similar to
that of a student who did not set a goal.
We test our predictions by means of a eld experiment among 1092 rst-year
economics students. Each of these rst-year students regularly has individual meet-
ings with a mentor (who is a senior student). Mentors help students to get used to
studying at a university, teach them study skills, help them with their (study) mo-
tivation, monitor their performance, and give suggestions in order to increase their
study performance. We ran our experiment during the second of three individual
meetings between students and their mentor. In one treatment (goal treatment) we
instructed mentors to ask their students whether they had a specic grade goal in
mind for the main course they participated in at that moment, and if not, whether
they wanted to set a grade goal. In another treatment (raise treatment) mentors re-
ceived identical instructions as in the goal treatment, and were in addition instructed
to encourage students to raise their goal if deemed appropriate. We subsequently
measured performance using the grades the student obtained for the course.
2The cost of rejecting the proposal to raise the goal can for example be a psychological cost or
a loss in reputation towards the mentor.
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We nd that students whose mentor was instructed to motivate students to set a
goal perform 0.16 better on a 10-point scale (which is 9.3% of a standard deviation)
than students in the control group. This e¤ect is driven by students in the goal
treatment dropping out less often than students in the control group. Students
whose mentor was instructed to also ask students to raise their goal do not perform
signicantly di¤erent from the control group. Finally, being asked to raise the goal
in the raise treatment leads to a signicant drop in performance as compared to
similar students in the goal treatment.
Setting goals can also have adverse e¤ects such as a narrow focus and ignorance
of non-goal tasks or even unethical behavior (see Ordonez et al. 2009). In our setting
a concern is that students increase e¤ort and performance on the course for which
they set a goal at the expense of the other course they take at the same time. We
estimate the e¤ect of the treatment on performance in the other course, and do not
nd such a negative e¤ect. This implies that motivating students to set a goal is
actually good for study performance overall.
Next, we look at heterogeneous treatment e¤ects. We test whether there are het-
erogeneous e¤ects of the treatments dependent on the students prior study results,
the mentors experience, mentors gender, and a match between mentors and stu-
dents gender. We nd that motivating students to set goals increases performance
mainly for students who were initially performing poorly. We do not nd a signif-
icant di¤erence in treatment e¤ect for students with more experienced mentors, or
for students who have the same gender as their mentor.
There is a rich literature in psychology studying goal setting and its e¤ects on
performance (see Locke 1996, Locke and Latham 2002, and Locke and Latham 2006
for literature reviews). Research in psychology groups goals in roughly three cat-
egories: goals set by an outsider, cooperatively set goals, and self-set goals. Our
goal treatment and raise treatment come closest to self-set goals and cooperatively
set goals, respectively. Further, the literature shows that other factors such as goal
commitment, goal specicity, and how challenging the goal is are important predic-
tors for the success of goals (see for example Hollenbeck et al. 1989, Locke 1996,
and Seijts et al. 2004). Our nding that the attempt to raise goals decreases stu-
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dentsperformance as compared to goal setting by the student may be explained
by a change in commitment to the goal, leading to a decrease in (study) motivation
and hence performance.
Our paper is related to a rapidly increasing number of experiments in economics
that study the e¤ects of di¤erent types of goal setting on performance in various
contexts. Experiments range from self-set goals to goals set by others. In some
papers goals are combined with monetary incentives (see e.g. Goerg and Kube 2012,
Dalton et al. 2015, and Corgnet et al. 2015, 2016) and in other papers goals are set
without monetary incentives (see e.g. Goerg and Kube 2012, Sackett et al. 2014, and
Clark et al. 2016). These studies typically nd that when ambitious but attainable
goals are set, goals increase performance, and more so when they are combined with
monetary incentives. Our main contribution to this literature is that we investigate
the e¤ects of raising goals, by increasing its di¢ culty in a cooperative manner.
Also closely related to our research is the literature on (non-monetary) incen-
tives for students in education. This literature considers a number of ways besides
setting goals, in which students performance can be increased.3 Lavecchia et al.
(2015) review studies of interventions in education designed to improve students
performance. The interventions target a wide range of behaviors varying from a
too little focus on the future, overreliance on routines, student self-condence, and
the information about and number of choices in education. Further, Sanders and
Chonaire (2015) show that in education usually (very) small e¤ect sizes are found.
The e¤ect we nd from goal setting is around the median e¤ect size found in the
sample of Sanders and Chonaire.4
Goal setting by students has received a lot of attention from psychologists, see
e.g. Ames and Archer (1988) and Schunk (1990) and more recently from manage-
ment scientists. Many of these papers have tested whether goal setting can increase
studentsperformance (see also Linnenbrink 2005, Morisano et al. 2010, Bettinger
and Baker 2013, Schippers et al. 2015, and Travers et al. 2015). Students not
3For example changes in the class size (see Angrist and Lavy 1999 and Bandiera et al. 2010),
providing feedback to students (see Bandiera et al. 2015), and several nancial and non-nancial
incentives (see Levitt et al. 2016).
4While the median e¤ect size in Sanders and Chonaire (2015) is 10% of a standard deviation,
our (almost) costless intervention has an e¤ect of 9.3% of a standard deviation.
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subjected to goal setting are typically subjected to other activities in these studies.
As a consequence these papers are unable to estimate the causal e¤ect of motivating
students to set goals. In our experiment the only di¤erence between the control and
treatment groups is that in the treatment groups mentors encourage students to set
a goal. Hence we are able to estimate the causal e¤ect of motivating students to set
goals on study performance. In addition we are the rst to consider challenging the
goals that students set by asking them to increase their goals di¢ culty.
Besides the contribution of our paper to the literature on goal setting, incentives
and performance in education, our paper can also be useful to management practi-
tioners. There is a large and growing literature on designing the optimal contract
(see Gibbons 2005 for a review), and recent work on the use of goals as an incen-
tive device (see e.g. Gomez-Minambres 2012). Our result that an encouragement
to increase a (self-set) goal in order to motivate students decreases performance is
of particular interest. In a workplace where a manager evaluates his workers, it
can be common practice to set goals or targets. Our ndings are a rst indication
that challenging workers to increase their goals di¢ culty might be detrimental for
performance.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we explain the experi-
mental context and describe the data. In section 3 we present a simple theoretical
framework and derive our hypotheses. In section 4 we explain the empirical strat-
egy. Section 5 presents the descriptive statistics, section 6 the results followed by a
discussion and conclusion in the nal section.
2.2 Experimental set-up and data description
2.2.1 Experimental context
The experiment involved 1092 rst-year students enrolled in several undergraduate
programmes at Erasmus School of Economics in Rotterdam, The Netherlands during
the 2014-2015 academic year. The year is divided into ve blocks of eight weeks.
In each block students take 12 study credits (ECTS) worth of courses. All courses
that students take at this point are obligatory, hence all students within a study
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programme take the same courses. Our experimental treatments take place during
the second block when students have their second individual meeting with their
mentor.
Each rst-year student has a mentor. Mentors are senior students and are ran-
domly assigned to students enrolled in the same programme at the start of the acad-
emic year. All mentors are employed by the university and are paid a at wage. Our
study involves all 84 mentors, and each mentor has 10 to 15 students. Mentors regu-
larly meet with their students, both in groups and individually. The mentor-student
meetings are intended to teach students study skills, monitor their motivation, and
more generally to provide a point of contact within the university. Motivation and
individual prospects are the primary subjects of the three individual mentor-student
meetings held over the course of the academic year. The rst individual mentor-
student meeting takes place arround the start of the academic year in September,
while the second and third take place in November and January, after the results
of respectively the rst and the second block of courses have been released. Our
treatments are administered during the second individual mentor-student meeting.
While the rst meeting at the start of the academic year primarily serves to
discuss the students motivation and to detect possible issues, the second and third
meeting serve to evaluate results and prospects of the students. Due to university
rules and national legislation, students with a weak performance record may be
better o¤ dropping out before February, which is in the third block of courses.
Dropping out on time results in minimal grant loss and additionally allows students
to re-enroll in the same programme the following academic year, which students that
otherwise fail to meet rst year requirements are not allowed to do. Thus, the second
meeting is a natural moment to look forward towards the rest of the academic year
and to discuss what results are necessary in order to make it sensible for the student
to continue their current study programme. The last individual meeting after the
release of the results for the second block serves mostly to determine whether it is
better for the student to drop out given her motivation and study results.
Students take two courses in the second block, an introductory course in micro-
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economics worth 8 ECTS and a programme specic 4 ECTS course.5 Our treatment
is focused on the microeconomics course. The course is taught in Dutch (824 enrolled
students) and English (268 enrolled students). The Dutch and English version are
identical in all respects except for the lecturers and language spoken. The course
follows a standard setup of three non-compulsory plenary lectures each week com-
plemented by two compulsory tutorials taught by teaching assistants. The tutorials
serve to review the course material, practice and discuss exercises, and in general to
provide students an accessible way to obtain further explanation and clarication of
the material. Tutorials are taught in 42 tutorial groups. One tutorial group consists
of the students of two mentor groups. Examination of the course follows a standard
format with two midterms counting 15% each and a written exam for the remain-
ing 70%. For both midterms and the nal exam students receive a grade on a 10
point scale, ranging from 1 to 10 with 10 being the best grade. In addition students
could obtain a bonus, which was equal to at most half a point of the nal grade, by
participating in weekly online tests.
2.2.2 Experimental design
Our experiment revolves around the second individual mentor-student meeting. We
instructed a random subset of 54 of the 84 mentors to motivate their students to set
a course specic grade goal during this mentor-student meeting. As discussed before,
this second meeting is an excellent opportunity for such a discussion as its purpose
is to reect on past performance and consider what results for the current courses
are necessary. This means that discussion of the progress of the current courses is
natural, and a focus on microeconomics is expected since it is the most important
course in the second block due to its weight in ECTS. Our treatment builds on this
discussion.
During meetings with all mentors in the period between 22 and 31 October 2014,
we informed the mentors that some of them would be expected to take a somewhat
di¤erent approach to the second individual meeting. Selected mentors were sent
5Students enrolled in the Economics and Business Economics, Fiscal Economics, and Law and
Economics programmes take besides microeonomics an ICT course, while Econometrics students
take a Calculus course.
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instructions by e-mail about how to complement the discussion regarding the current
courses one and a half week before the meetings. The instructions were accompanied
by a simple ow diagram (see Appendix 2.A.1 and 2.A.2). All 54 selected mentors
conrmed that they understood the instructions.
Randomly selected mentors were instructed to ask students whether they have a
specic goal in terms of a grade in mind for the main course, microeconomics, and
if so to elicit that grade goal. If the student did not have a grade goal in mind, the
student was asked whether she wants to set one on the spot, again eliciting the goal
set. Students were free not to set a goal. Mentors were asked to write down their
evaluation of the goal of the student, evaluating the students goal as either "too
easy", "doable" or "too hard". The description of the treatment so far describes the
goal treatment. Thus in this treatment, mentors are asked to induce their students
to set themselves a specic grade goal for the main course in the second block.
A second group of mentors were randomly selected to perform the raise treatment.
In the raise treatment mentors implement the goal treatment but are additionaly
requested to attempt to raise the goal (if any) set by the student when deemed
appropriate. If the mentor described the goal as "doable" or "too easy" the mentor
was instructed to challenge the student by asking whether the student shouldnt be
more ambitious and aim for a higher grade, specically the students self-set goal +
1 (e.g. if the students goal was to get a 6 the mentor suggested aiming for a 7).
The raise treatment serves to determine whether raising self-set goals can (further)
improve study performance. Figure 2.1 illustrates the similarities and di¤erences
between the goal and raise treatment using a owchart.
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We chose to elicit a grade goal instead of other course related goals for multiple
reasons. First, the nal grade is (one of) the most important motivations to study for
many students, hence students might nd it more useful to set grade goals compared
to other goals. Second, choosing an output goal (the nal grade) instead of an input
goal (e.g. study hours) leads to lower measurement error because we cannot perfectly
measure study hours. Finally, a grade goal is specic and measurable, which are
important factors that inuence the success of a goal (Locke and Latham 2002).
As our measure of performance we do not take the nal microeconomics grade.
Instead we use a normalized version of the microeconomics grade without the rst
midterm result as our treatment is administered in the week of the rst midterm.
Hence, not all students have received treatment prior to the rst midterm, while
those that do have very limited time to respond.
Mentors were asked to record the outcome of the meetings on a form. We speci-
cally asked mentors to note whether or not they brought up goals in order to identify
treated subjects. Mentors record whether students set a goal, what the goal is, and
their estimate of the di¢ culty of the goal. In the raise treatment mentors further
record whether they asked students to raise their goal and whether or not the stu-
dent accepted this higher goal. The mentors estimate of the di¢ culty of the initial
goal allows us to compare students in the raise treatment whose goal was challenged
with similar students in the goal treatment whose goal was not challenged but would
have been challenged if they were in the raise treatment.
Besides the forms lled in by the mentors selected to implement the treatments
we obtain information on all the students from administrative data from the micro-
economics course and the central administrative o¢ ce. This gives us information on
the students performance in other courses, attendance of microeconomics tutorial
sessions, gender, age, study programme, and mentor.6 From the administration of-
ce we further obtained the mentors gender and whether the mentor had experience
in mentoring in previous years.
Only the mentors and lecturers were aware an experiment was being imple-
mented, although mentors were not explicitly told so. Our introduction to all men-
6From students in Dutch study programmes who attended a Dutch high school, we also have
highschool grades.
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tors in a general mentor instruction meeting necessitated that we informed all men-
tors that some of them would be asked to implement a small change in the upcoming
individual mentor-student meetings. However, those not sent specic instructions
were not aware of the exact change implemented. We specically instructed the men-
tors who were selected for a treatment not to talk to anyone regarding our request.
Selected mentors may deduce the purpose of the research but were not informed
beyond their own instructions provided in Appendix 2.A.1 and 2.A.2. Finally, both
authors of this paper were involved in the microeconomics course as teaching as-
sistants. Because of this we took precautionary measures to prevent ourselves from
learning the treatment assignment.7
2.2.3 Assignment procedure
The assignment of students to both treatments and the control group is random-
ized at the mentor level. Assignment at the mentor level was chosen in order to
increase compliance and prevent contamination. With assignment at the student
level, a given mentor would be charged with treating her students di¤erently, in a
random order over the talks (students select a timeslot), likely leading to mistakes.
In addition to accidental non-compliance, student level assignment might also re-
sult in more selective non-compliance by mentors selecting the treatment for their
student(s) that they think is most appropriate.
The assignment of mentors to treatment was randomized in a stratied manner
as follows. First, given that the tutorial group has a large impact on student per-
formance as it is the main instruction method for many students, we ensure that a
tutorial group is always of mixed composition in terms of treatments and control.
This serves to create similar conditions for students in all treatments, but comes
with the risk of contamination because students from treatment and control are in
the same tutorial group. Randomization takes place within the various study pro-
7The randomization was programmed by one of the authors who received the list of mentors
linked to tutorial groups. A researcher from the department was asked to perform the random-
ization and send only the list of mentor contacts and treatment assignment to the other author.
Since the author receiving this information was unaware which mentors belong to which group it
was impossible for either of the authors to relate mentors to (half of) a tutorial group.
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grammes o¤ered by the school as the e¤ect of treatment can di¤er by programme
due to the selection of students in a programme and the di¢ culty of the other course
o¤ered. Finally, several teaching assistants teach multiple tutorial groups. We there-
fore enforce that classes taught by the same teaching assistant have an (even) mix of
control and treatment groups.8 In doing so we ensure that teaching assistants who
teach classes in two di¤erent study programmes have a mix of control and treatment
groups.
Randomization takes place by taking one random draw for each teaching assis-
tant. Draws were compared between teaching assistants teaching the same number
of mentor groups. The rst mentor group is assigned to the control group if the
draw belongs to the highest third of the draws. The middle and lowest third of the
draws were assigned to the goal and raise treatment respectively. The assignment
of the other groups taught by a teaching assistant then follows from the assignment
of the rst group by cycling through the list of possible assignments in order. The
procedure is illustrated in Figure 2. We prioritized rst the control and then the
goal treatment. The nal result of this randomization is that 30 mentors are in the
control group, 28 in the goal treatment and 26 are in the raise treatment. This
corresponds to 389 students in control, 367 in the goal treatment and 336 students
in the raise treatment.
8For example, if a teaching assistant teaches two groups he teaches four mentor groups of which
at least one group is assigned to each treatment and at least one group is a control group.
2.3 Theoretical framework and predictions 23
2.3 Theoretical framework and predictions
We are interested in the e¤ects of goal setting and attempts to raise goals on students
study performance. To x ideas, let us consider the following stylized framework.
Consider a student who values obtaining a high grade but dislikes to study. Let
her utility be given by:
U = e  1
2
e2
where e is her study e¤ort which results in grade e. The students ability is given
by  such that more able students have a lower cost of study e¤ort. In this scenario
the student optimally sets e =  yielding utility 1
2
.
Now let the student set a goal to motivate herself. Assume that the student
values meeting her goal and that her utility from reaching this goal increases in goal
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di¢ culty. Meeting a goal may be intrinsically rewarding (see e.g. Gomez-Minambres
2012) or there may be some external motivation, for instance reputational concerns
towards someone who is aware of the goal. Specically, let the students utility
function in case she sets a goal g be given by:
U = e+ I (e  g) g   1
2
e2;
where I (e  g) is an indicator function that equals 1 if the goal is met (i.e. if e  g)
and 0 otherwise.9 Since the student already exerts e =  without a goal, setting a
non-challenging goal g   does not a¤ect her study performance. In that case she
would be best o¤ setting a goal gNC = , which yields her utility UNC = 3
2
.
Next consider the student setting a goal that challenges her to exert more e¤ort,
g > . The student optimally meets such a goal by exerting e = g.10 Given this, the
student sets her goal to maximize her utility resulting in the optimal challenging goal
gC = 2. The student obtains utility UC = 2 from setting herself the challenging
goal, exceeding the utility UNC = 3
2
 derived from setting the non-challenging goal.
Thus the student is best o¤ setting a challenging goal for herself, boosting her study
performance. This demonstrates our rst prediction:
Prediction 1: Setting goals increases student performance.
Now consider what happens when the goal is raised above gC by an outsider.
Given that the student is better o¤ under her optimal goal gC as compared to either
not setting a goal or setting an unchallenging goal she will still be better o¤ under
goals that deviate from gC slightly as compared to not setting a goal (U = 1
2
) or
setting a non-challenging goal (UNC = 3
2
). Thus changing the goal from gC to a
higher goal can improve performance.11 This leads us to our second prediction:
9Most economic theory papers on goal setting model the agents utility function assuming
loss aversion. Agents get utility if they reach their goal and a disutility from not reaching this
goal. Since in our simplied model e¤ort maps directly into a grade, i.e. without any noise or
uncertainty, agents never end up in the loss domain. Hence, these richer models would yield the
same predictions as our simplied model. In case there is noise or uncertainty and agents are loss
averse, the results marginally change. Some agents may no longer be willing to set goals, goals
become less ambitious, but there is still some room to raise goals.
10Note that the student will never choose e > g, because then she would have a strictly higher
utility if she would set a goal g0, such that e = g0 > g.
11Note that although performance (i.e. e) increases when a goal higher than gC is achieved,
utility will be lower compared to the student setting and reaching gC .
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Prediction 2: Raising goals can increase student performance.
A raised goal can lead to higher performance if the student accepts the proposal
to raise the goal. A student will accept this proposal to raise if there is a cost of
rejecting the goal that is proposed by the outsider, and if the proposed raise is not
too high.12 If the proposed raise is too high, the student will not accept the proposed
goal. This leads to a similar performance as when the student was not asked to raise
the goal (this happens when the students outside option is the initial goal), or this
leads to performance that is similar to setting non-challening or even no goals (this
happens when the students outside option is no goal or a non-challenging goal).
Alternatively, since the goal is raised by an outsider, the student may not derive as
much utility from meeting the goal as from self set goals.13 This leads the student
to perform worse because she is less motivated to reach the goal.
2.4 Empirical strategy
We estimate the e¤ects of motivating students to set goals and attempts to raise
studentsself-set goals in two ways. First we estimate an intention-to-treat e¤ect,
comparing the results of students of mentors assigned to treatments to the results of
students of mentors assigned to the control group. Random assignment of mentors to
treatments coupled with random assignment of students to mentors should result in
ex ante similarity between students. We thus attribute di¤erences between students
in the control and treatments after our intervention to the intervention. We estimate
the intention-to-treat (ITT) e¤ect by:
Pi = 0 + 1Gi + 2Ri + 3Xi + "i
where Pi is student is study performance, Xi a vector of control variables and "i
the error term. Gi and Ri are treatment dummies indicating whether a students
mentor was assigned to the goal or raise treatment respectively. To be more precise
12Costs of rejecting the proposal to raise the goal can for example be psychological or reputa-
tional costs.
13See e.g. Hollenbeck et al. (1989) for evidence on commitment to self-set goals versus assigned
goals.
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on student performance, Pi is not the nal grade of a student. The nal grade
for the course is composed of two midterm exams (both with weight 15%) and a
nal exam (with weight 70%). Since the mentor-student meeting is in the same
week as the rst midterm, students hardly change their study behavior for the rst
midterm, and so we expect the treatment to only a¤ect the later exams of the
course. Hence we take as student performance a normalized combination of the
second midterm and the nal exam. Our performance measure is hence calculated
as (0.15*midterm2+0.7*nal)/0.85.14 The coe¢ cients 1 and 2 are the intention-
to-treat estimates of the e¤ect of having a mentor who was assigned to treatment.
The intention-to-treat e¤ect is an imperfect measure of the e¤ect of a student setting
a goal or of attempts to raise that goal as there is bound to be some non-compliance.
Not all students who are intended to get treated will get treated, for instance due to
more pressing concerns in the meeting such as personal circumstances of the student.
Likewise, although mentors not assigned to treatment are unaware of the nature of
the treatment, some students of mentors that were assigned to the control group
might self-treat by setting a goal and discuss this with the mentor. Thus while
this estimate does not isolate the e¤ect of setting and attempting to raise goals per
se, it does provide an unbiased estimate of the intention to treat. Further, as the
intention-to-treat e¤ect relies on assigned, not actual, treatment non-compliance is
likely to result in an underestimation of the actual e¤ect.
Given that we ask treated mentors to report which students set themselves a goal
and which students they asked to raise their goal, it may be tempting to directly
compare students setting goals to those that do not. However, this would yield a
misleading estimate of the e¤ect of treatment if selection into or out of treatment
is not random as it would compare individuals that are not ex ante identical. In-
stead we estimate the e¤ect of treatment on those students whose treatment status
is changed as a result of the experiment, also known as the local average treat-
ment e¤ect (LATE). In a rst stage we regress actual treatment status on student
characteristics and treatment assignment. Here treatment assignment serves as an
14The weights assigned to the second midterm and the nal exam in our performance measure,
0.15 and 0.70 respectively, are the same as the weights used in the compostion of the nal grade
for students.
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instrument for actual treatment. Predicted treatment status then takes into account
the observable characteristics of those in treatment and can be used in a second stage
regression to explain study performance.
Thus the e¤ect of setting a goal on those induced to set a goal may be estimated
using as a rst stage:
Ti = '0 + '1Gi + '2Ri + '3Xi + i
where Ti indicates whether student i actually sets a goal, i is the error term and
Gi and Ri are the dummy variables indicating whether the students mentor was
assigned to the goal or raise treatment respectively. This rst stage is then followed
by estimating:
Pi = 0 + 1 bTi + 2Xi + "i
Here again Pi is student i s study performance, Xi a vector of control variables and
"i the error term. The e¤ect of interest is the coe¢ cient 1 of predicted treatment
status bTi following from the rst stage regression.
There are two main reasons to include covariates in our regressions. First, since
we assign treatment randomly conditional on the students programme and teaching
assistant we include dummies for the tutorial groups which subsume both these
categories. Second, we include statistics on past study performance. Past study
performance is highly predictive of present study performance and hence including
measures of past performance reduces noise in the data, allowing for more precise
estimates. We additionally include the students gender, the mentors gender and a
dummy for the mentors experience since, as will be discussed later, actual treatment
depends on these variables to some extent. Since treatment is assigned at the mentor
level and studentsperformance can be a¤ected by something that is mentor specic
(e.g. mentorssocial skills), there is the possibility of confusing treatment e¤ects
with unobservable mentor level e¤ects. To deal with this the best we can, we cluster
the errors of the regressions at the mentor level.
We assign students that do not complete the course a failing grade for those grade
components that they do not complete. By giving the highest and lowest possible
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failing grade we derive lower and upper bounds of the total e¤ect of treatment.15
The highest failing grade is a 4.4 and the lowest a 1.0 at a 1 to 10 scale. Students
who score a 4.5 or higher can still pass the course by scoring well in other courses.
In our results we will focus on the lowest grade as the lowest possible failing grade is
the grade that is actually given to students who do not pass the course. Further, for
context consider that those who do not take the nal exam but do take the second
midterm score a 1.5 on average compared to the overall average of 5.7. The total
e¤ect of our treatments that we measure in this manner is composed of an e¤ect on
the intensive margin and an e¤ect on the extensive margin. We also provide separate
estimates for the e¤ect on study performance for those students who complete the
course, and for the e¤ects on course participation (demonstrating selection e¤ects).
2.5 Descriptive statistics
Our dataset contains information on 1092 students, 824 of whom are enrolled in a
Dutch language programme with the remaining 268 students enrolled in an Eng-
lish language programme. Given that students are randomly assigned to mentor
groups at the start of the academic year and the mentors are randomly assigned to
treatment and control we do not expect to nd any ex ante di¤erences between the
two treatment groups and the control group. Table 2.1 gives the descriptive statis-
tics for the control (C), goal (G) and raise (R) group, as well as giving the p-value
for two-sided comparisons of the means of these groups. Although the control and
treatment groups appear to be comparable, there are some di¤erences between the
groups. Specically, the characteristics of mentors of students in the treatment and
control groups di¤er.16 Students in the control group are signicantly more likely to
have a female mentor whereas students in the raise treatment are more likely to have
an experienced mentor.17 Furthermore treatment students in a Dutch language eco-
15By assigning the highest and lowest possible failing grade we get a lower and upper bound
respectively because (as we will show later) the positive treatment e¤ect conditional on completing
the course is combined with a lower drop out rate.
16At the time of the randomization the information on mentor characteristics was not available
to us. Hence we could not stratify our randomization on mentor characteristics.
17We dene an experienced mentor as a mentor who mentored students in earlier years.
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nomics track (as opposed to students in an English language economics track) scored
lower for the 8 credits accounting course in the rst block than students in the con-
trol group, but there is no such di¤erence regarding the mathematics course, which
is more important for microeconomics.18 In the analysis we control for di¤erences
in observables.
Table 2.1: Descriptives by assigned treatment
Control Goal Raise C - G C - R G - R
mean sd mean sd mean sd p p p
Age 18.72 1.71 18.63 1.39 18.75 1.27 0.57 0.85 0.39
Female 0.29 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.87 0.95 0.93
Female mentor 0.52 0.50 0.31 0.46 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.46
Experience mentor 0.31 0.46 0.38 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.03 0.00 0.00
EC Accounting 6.45 1.61 6.13 1.51 5.96 1.73 0.06 0.01 0.31
ECX Accounting 5.82 1.72 5.95 1.91 5.74 1.92 0.70 0.79 0.56
EC Math 5.98 1.56 5.87 1.43 5.91 1.63 0.49 0.70 0.79
ECX Math 6.48 1.51 6.64 1.63 6.66 1.38 0.58 0.51 0.96
ET Matrix Alg. 6.48 1.94 6.13 1.88 6.02 2.38 0.32 0.29 0.79
ETX Matrix Alg. 7.54 2.11 6.92 1.81 7.58 2.18 0.28 0.95 0.31
ET Precalculus 6.46 1.50 6.04 1.78 5.72 2.20 0.17 0.05 0.41
ETX Precalculus 7.42 1.79 6.54 2.29 7.25 1.98 0.13 0.74 0.31
ET Statistics 5.09 2.07 4.45 1.68 4.43 2.23 0.07 0.13 0.96
ETX Statistics 6.35 2.51 5.50 2.31 5.29 2.17 0.23 0.13 0.78
Microeconomics 6.48 1.76 6.48 1.62 6.29 1.89 0.95 0.19 0.20
Midterm I 4.89 2.25 4.80 2.10 4.78 2.23 0.58 0.55 0.94
Attendance 10.66 2.98 10.66 3.15 10.71 2.85 0.98 0.81 0.84
Dropout 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.31 0.14 0.34 0.21 0.94 0.26
Max. Observations 389 367 336
Students enroll in an economics (EC) track or an econometrics (ET) track in a Dutch or international (X)
programme. Tracks in the Dutch and international programme are identical. Di¤erent tracks feature
di¤erent courses, although some courses (e.g. Microeconomics) are common to all tracks.
At rst sight Table 2.1 suggests that the treatments had no e¤ect as there is no
signicant di¤erence between the various groups in terms of the nal grade received
for the microeconomics course. However this simple direct comparison does not take
into account the characteristics of students.
Selection into or out of treatment is an issue a¤ecting the generalizability of
18In Table 2.1 we tested for di¤erences between control and treatment groups using t-tests. We
obtain similar results if we use nonparametric tests.
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the results to the whole population. In our experiment there are three sources of
selection out of the treatment. First, despite our best e¤orts to get all mentors to co-
operate and ensure their understanding of the instructions, not all mentors assigned
to treatment applied the treatment or took notes when administering the treatment.
There are seven mentors for whom we do not have data about what happened dur-
ing the individual student-mentor meetings. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some
mentors have administered the treatment but not recorded the results while others
did not administer the treatment at all. Thus this missing data forms a combination
of measurement error and selection out of treatment. On average these mentors
have less experience (5 out of 7 have no experience) than other mentors assigned to
treatment (25 out of 47). Six of these seven mentors were assigned to the raise treat-
ment, which was somewhat more demanding for mentors as mentors were asked to
challenge their students goals. Mentors may also feel more apprehension to adminis-
ter treatment when their students had weak prior performance. However, compared
to other students assigned to treatment, students of non-complying mentors do not
di¤er in terms of prior performance.
The missing data on treatment administration has diverse e¤ects on our esti-
mated treatment e¤ects. Estimation of an intention-to-treat e¤ect requires knowl-
edge of assigned treatment only. Thus, the missing data on treatment administration
has no e¤ect on our estimates of the intention to treat e¤ect. However, the estimates
of the treatment e¤ect on the treated (LATE) are a¤ected as those estimates require
knowledge of treatment administration to students. The possibly non-random miss-
ing data, caused by mentors who did not administer the treatment, may lead to
biased estimates of the LATE.
Second, there is some treatment dilution as mentors do not administer the treat-
ment to all students. Mentors assigned to treatment ask students for their grade
goal in 93% of the cases although they were instructed to administer the treatment
to all. Moreover, mentors are selective in which students they target for treatment.
Specically, students who performed poorly in previous courses are less likely to be
asked about their goals as is shown in Table 2.2. In cases in which mentors did not
ask students about their goals they often noted a lack of time due to the necessity
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to discuss other issues. Also, conditional on receiving the data from the mentor, we
nd that more experienced mentors are less likely to administer treatment.19 In the
raise treatment, mentors were instructed to attempt to raise the students goal when
he/she deemed the goal to be either too easy or doable. Of the 193 students setting
a goal in the raise treatment 163 set a goal that met this requirement. However,
mentors attempt to raise the goal in only 95 of these cases (58%), including all 47
cases where the goal is deemed too easy.20 Overall students who are asked to raise
their goal have slightly higher grades than those not asked, although di¤erences are
largely insignicant.21 See Table 2.3 for more descriptives of the comparison between
students asked and not asked to raise their goal.
Table 2.2: Students asked and not asked to set a goal within the treatment groups
Not asked to set goal Asked to set goal
Mean Observations Mean Observations p-value
Age 18.50 26 18.71 308 0.43
Female 0.30 37 0.27 483 0.69
Female mentor 0.22 37 0.34 492 0.14
Exp. mentor 0.62 37 0.46 492 0.06
EC Math 5.02 19 5.87 294 0.02
ECX Math 5.60 6 6.71 78 0.08
ET Precalculus 4.60 3 6.20 64 0.14
ETX Precalculus 5.50 2 7.43 22 0.24
EC Accounting 4.55 19 6.12 293 0.00
ECX Accounting 4.85 6 5.88 77 0.20
ET Matrix Alg. 4.47 3 6.35 63 0.10
ETX Matrix Alg. 6.70 2 7.85 22 0.46
ET Statistics 2.77 3 4.83 61 0.06
ETX Statistics 3.50 2 5.95 22 0.14
See Table 2.1 for an explanation of terms.
19Experienced mentors ask 90.5% of their students to set a goal, while non-experienced mentors
ask 95% of their students to set a goal.
20In addition, there are 9 instances where the mentor asks a student to raise the goal even
though she estimated the goal to be too di¢ cult.
21The low number of observations for the Dutch econometrics courses is due to the fact that
three of the four Dutch econometrics mentors assigned to the raise treatment failed to provide
data.
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Table 2.3: Students asked and not asked to raise their goal in the raise treatment
No raise proposed Raise proposed
Mean Observations Mean Observations p-value
Age 18.79 84 18.59 75 0.29
Female 0.26 127 0.25 100 0.87
Female mentor 0.29 128 0.38 104 0.17
Exp. mentor 0.58 128 0.45 104 0.06
EC Math 5.63 70 6.04 74 0.13
ECX Math 6.32 21 7.24 17 0.03
ET Precalculus 6.26 7 6.97 3 0.73
ETX Precalculus 7.31 13 7.88 4 0.63
EC Accounting 5.69 69 6.24 75 0.06
ECX Accounting 5.25 21 6.31 17 0.10
ET Matrix Alg. 6.31 7 6.40 3 0.97
ETX Matrix Alg. 7.58 13 8.80 4 0.30
ET Statistics 5.36 7 7.40 3 0.22
ETX Statistics 5.44 13 6.47 4 0.37
See Table 2.1 for an explanation of terms.
Also 12% (59) of the 492 students asked for a goal do not set a goal. These are
all students who previously did not have a goal in mind. While students are more
likely to set a goal if they have a female mentor there are no signicant di¤erences
between those setting and not setting a goal in terms of past performance as shown
in Table 2.4. Of all students asked to raise their goal half accept a higher goal. Again
there is no signicant di¤erence in terms of past study results, but students are less
likely to accept a raise from more experienced mentors (p-value 0.03), see Table 2.5.
Furthermore, the level of the initial goal set has no inuence on the acceptance of a
suggested raise of the goal.
It is of interest to note that 270 of the 492 students (55%) asked to set a goal
already had a grade they wanted to achieve in mind. The fact that many students
already have a grade goal in mind implies that any e¤ect of our treatment comes
either from those who previously did not have a goal, or from the fact that students
make the goal known to their mentor. The average initial goal set by the student is
6.9, a histogram of the goals set is shown in Figure 2.3. As expected higher (lower)
goals are more likely to be deemed too hard (too easy) to achieve for the student
by their mentor. Mentors appear to be able to gauge goal di¢ culty, as a regression
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Table 2.4: Students that set and do not set goals when asked to set a goal
Set Goal No goal set
Mean Observations Mean Observations p
Age 18.74 265 18.58 43 0.48
Female 0.27 424 0.27 59 0.94
Female Mentor 0.35 433 0.22 59 0.05
Exp. Mentor 0.47 433 0.41 59 0.39
EC Math 5.85 254 5.99 40 0.60
ECX Math 6.67 73 7.16 5 0.49
ET Precalculus 6.28 57 5.57 7 0.32
ETX Precalculus 7.62 20 5.55 2 0.19
EC Accounting 6.12 252 6.17 41 0.85
ECX Accounting 5.96 72 4.78 5 0.18
ET Matrix Alg. 6.28 57 7.00 6 0.39
ETX Matrix Alg. 7.89 20 7.40 2 0.74
ET Statistics 4.90 55 4.18 6 0.38
ETX Statistics 6.03 20 5.20 2 0.62
Midterm I 4.77 426 4.47 55 0.32
See Table 1 for an explanation of terms.
Table 2.5: Students that accept and reject raise when asked to raise the goal
Reject raise Accept raise
Mean Observations Mean Observations p-value
Age 18.53 38 18.65 37 0.60
Female 0.22 50 0.28 50 0.49
Female mentor 0.46 52 0.29 52 0.07
Exp. mentor 0.56 52 0.35 52 0.03
EC Math 5.93 37 6.15 37 0.57
ECX Math 6.78 9 7.75 8 0.10
ET Precalculus 4.70 1 8.10 2 .
ETX Precalculus 8.85 2 6.90 2 0.34
EC Accounting 6.52 38 5.95 37 0.13
ECX Accounting 6.12 9 6.51 8 0.70
ET Matrix Alg. 4.60 1 7.30 2 .
ETX Matrix Alg. 9.90 2 7.70 2 0.33
ET Statistics 6.10 1 8.05 2 .
ETX Statistics 7.25 2 5.70 2 0.54
Initial goal 6.60 52 6.53 52 0.62
See Table 1 for an explanation of terms.
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of the di¤erence between the nal grade achieved and the initial goal set on the
estimate of the mentor shows in Table 2.6. Goals that were expected to be too
di¢ cult were not achieved on average whereas goals that were too easy are indeed
beaten by a signicant margin. Furthermore all point estimates of the judgment
categories di¤er signicantly from each other, indicating that mentors di¤erentiate
well between the three categories. On average students failed to meet their goal by
0.4 of a point. There may be a concern that mentors assigned to the raise treatment
are more likely to report that they expect the students goal te be too di¢ cult, in
order to avoid challenging the students to raise their goal. We test whether the
distribution of the mentors estimates of the studentsgoal di¤ers across treatments.
We do not nd evidence of such an e¤ect.
Of the students who were asked to raise their goal we see that 50 percent (52)
rejects the goal the mentor proposed. The average goal proposed does not di¤er
(two-sided p-value of 0.62) between students who accept and reject the goal.
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Table 2.6: Mentor estimates are accurate
grade - goal
Goal too hard -1.507
(0.261)
Goal too easy 0.337
(0.412)
Baseline: doable -0.446
(0.261)
Observations 406
R2 0.111
Standard errors in parentheses.
 p < :1,  p < :05,  p < :01
Finally, there are some di¤erences between students participating in Dutch lan-
guage and international (English) programmes. The programmes are identical in all
respects, featuring the same courses, study materials, and examinations, but have a
somewhat di¤erent application procedure. Students applying for a Dutch language
programme need to have only a high school diploma meeting the requirements,
whereas those applying for an international programme are additionally selected
based on a motivation letter. This suggests that students in the international lan-
guage programmes might be better motivated. Consistent with this, Table 2.7 shows
that, with the exception of an accounting course, students enrolled in international
programmes scored signicantly higher in the courses completed prior to the experi-
ment. In our analysis we control for programme enrolment and additionally provide
separate estimates of the e¤ects within the Dutch and international programmes.
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Table 2.7: Previous course results in Dutch and international programmes
International Dutch
Mean n Mean n p
EC Math 6.58 172 5.92 531 0.00
EC Accounting 5.84 170 6.18 529 0.02
ET Matrix Alg. 7.39 72 6.23 162 0.00
ET Statistics 5.84 71 4.67 158 0.00
ET Precalculus 7.14 71 6.10 164 0.00
See Table 2.1 for an explanation of terms.
2.6 Results
We rst provide the total e¤ect of the treatments, imputing a failing grade for
students who did not complete the course. We then provide the results for students
that complete the course before turning our attention to the results for students who
did not complete the course.
2.6.1 Total e¤ect
We estimate the total e¤ect of the treatments by imputing the highest and lowest
possible grade that would result in failing to pass the course for those graded aspects
of the course that the student did not complete. As discussed in section 4, we focus
on the case in which we impute a missing grade as 1.0, as this appears to be the
most relevant case.
Table 2.8 gives the result of the intention to treat estimations. We nd a weakly
signicant (p < 0:1) positive e¤ect of 0.16 of a gradepoint (i.e. 9.3% of a standard
deviation) for students in the goal treatment and an insignicant negative e¤ect
of the raise treatment. The positive e¤ect of assignment to the goal treatment is
in line with our hypothesis that setting goals improves student performance. The
insignicant negative e¤ect in the raise treatment shows that attempts to raise a
goal backre, resulting in performance similar to students in the control group. The
results are estimated separately for men and women in columns 3 and 4 of Table
2.8. We see that men hardly respond to the treatments, and the e¤ects are (mainly)
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driven by women. Women in the goal treatment show a substantial positive e¤ect of
0.36, amounting to approximately 20% of a standard deviation of the grade. There
is also a signicant negative e¤ect of -0.26 of a gradepoint of the raise treatment.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.8 provide separate estimates for students in Dutch
and international programmes. These estimates show a widely divergent response
to the treatments in these two groups, with Dutch programme students responding
positively to the goal treatment while students in international programmes respond
to the raise treatment in a strongly negative manner. Finally, in the second column of
Table 2.8 we show the results excluding the students of mentors who did not hand in
a form. These students are less likely to have been subjected to treatment, therefore
the second column may give an indication of the e¤ect size when compliance rates
are higher than they were in our experiment. Recall from the descriptive statistics
section that students of mentors not handing in forms do not di¤er from those of
other mentors in the treatment groups in observable characteristics. The positive
e¤ect of the goal treatment is stronger in these estimates while the e¤ect of the raise
treatment is again negative but insignicant. The overall picture that emerges from
the intention to treat estimates is that setting goals can help, but attempting to
raise goals undoes any positive e¤ect of setting goals and may even result in worse
performance as compared to students that were assigned to the control group.
The e¤ects of actually having set a goal during the individual student-mentor
meeting and of having been asked to raise the goal is given in Table 2.9. In the
rst column we provide the overall e¤ect of having set a goal in the meeting without
di¤erentiating between treatments. This gives the relevant e¤ect if one does not
expect raising the goal set to have any e¤ect. However there are di¤erences between
the e¤ect of the goal and the raise treatment as shown in the second column. Setting
a goal by itself has a signicantly positive e¤ect on student performance under the
goal treatment. Setting a goal under the raise treatment has no such positive e¤ect,
the point estimate of the e¤ect is even negative. In column 3 we compare students
who set a goal in the two treatments with each other. Specically column 3 shows
that the di¤erence between the goal and the raise treatment is due to the fact that
in the raise treatment some students are asked to raise their goal, which on average
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Table 2.8: Intention to treat e¤ect: total e¤ect
Grade Overall Excl. 7 mentors Male Female Dutch International
Missing grade=1.0
T: Goal 0.164 0.256 0.140 0.359 0.333 -0.102
(0.090) (0.088) (0.110) (0.172) (0.115) (0.119)
T: Raise -0.156 -0.113 -0.0181 -0.262 0.0179 -0.421
(0.101) (0.102) (0.126) (0.148) (0.117) (0.154)
Missing grade=4.4
T: Goal 0.099 0.167 0.074 0.303 0.251 -0.102
(0.079) (0.079) (0.092) (0.159) (0.095) (0.119)
T: Raise -0.138 -0.110 -0.017 -0.227 0.040 -0.421
(0.089) (0.089) (0.103) (0.146) (0.094) (0.154)
Observations 955 868 678 277 719 236
Tutorgroups 84 77 84 81 60 24
R2 (Upper) 0.619 0.630 0.621 0.691 0.615 0.641
R2 (Lower) 0.616 0.624 0.621 0.695 0.610 0.641
Standard errors in parentheses.
 p < :1,  p < :05,  p < :01
lowers performance by a substantial 0.87 gradepoint (i.e. more than half a standard
deviation) as compared to similar students who set a goal but were not asked to
raise their goal. These results are in line with the intention to treat estimates,
showing that setting a goal during the individual student-mentor meetings improves
performance, but attempts to raise those goals undo that positive e¤ect and may
result in even lower performance.22
22To make sure that we compare students who are asked to raise their goal in the raise treatment
with their counterparts in the goal treatment we controlled for the mentors estimate about the
di¢ culty of the students goal. There might be a concern that mentors in the raise treatment report
a biased estimate because they want to avoid asking students to raise their goal. We tested for
such an e¤ect by comparing treatment e¤ects for those students of which the mentor reports that
the goal is too di¢ cult. If mentors in the raise treatment bias their estimate in order to avoid
asking students to raise their goal we would expect the treatment e¤ect to be more positive in
the raise treatment than in the goal treatment. We do not nd such an e¤ect. In addition we
compare the distribution of mentorsestimates about the goals across the treatments. Because of
randomization the distributions should be similar. We nd no evidence that the distribution di¤ers
across treatments.
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Table 2.9: Local average treatment e¤ect: total e¤ect
Grade Overall By Treatment AskedToRaise
Missing grade=1.0
Set Goal 0.027
(0.113)
Set Goal T: Goal 0.257
(0.118)
Set Goal T: Raise -0.263
(0.164)
Asked to Raise -0.870
(0.334)
Missing grade=4.4
Set Goal -0.014
(0.101)
Set Goal T: Goal 0.164
(0.104)
Set Goal T: Raise -0.238
(0.146)
Asked to Raise -0.492
(0.316)
Controls yes yes yes
Instruments T. assignment T. assignment R. assignment
Observations 966 966 411
Tutorgroups 84 84 47
R2 (Upper) 0.613 0.618 0.639
R2 (Lower) 0.610 0.613 0.634
Standard errors in parentheses.
 p < :1,  p < :05,  p < :01
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The total e¤ect of our treatments discussed above consists of two e¤ects. First the
treatments may have an impact on the students who complete the course inducing
them to alter their e¤orts. This is the e¤ect on the intensive margin. Second, our
treatments may a¤ect the extensive margin, the decision to participate in the course.
These two e¤ects cannot be interpreted separately as this risks the confusion of
selection e¤ects on the extensive margin for the e¤ects of treatment on the intensive
margin. We turn to these two e¤ects now.
2.6.2 Intensive margin
Table 2.10 gives the intention-to-treat estimates for those students that complete the
course. The results are largely in line with the overall estimates provided in Table
2.8. We nd that the overall positive e¤ect of being assigned to the goal treatment
is no longer signicant for the students that complete the course. But results in the
female and Dutch programme subsamples are similar and signicant. The results
conrm the overall impression that setting goals can improve student performance,
and that raising goals has an insignicant negative e¤ect on performance.
The e¤ects of having actually set a goal during the individual student-mentor
meeting and of having been asked to raise the goal is given in Table 2.11. Also these
results are largely in line with the overall treatment e¤ect, and show the positive
impact of actually setting a goal which is negated by being asked to raise the goal.
Table 2.10: Intention to treat e¤ect: intensive margin
Grade Overall Excl. 7 mentors Male Female Dutch International
T: Goal 0.112 0.193 0.069 0.361 0.265 0.011
(0.078) (0.077) (0.093) (0.178) (0.091) (0.125)
T: Raise -0.147 -0.117 -0.007 -0.262 0.054 -0.428
(0.092) (0.095) (0.103) (0.151) (0.091) (0.177)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 940 854 661 279 697 243
Mentorgroups 84 77 84 82 60 24
R2 0.609 0.616 0.626 0.674 0.605 0.627
Standard errors in parentheses.
 p < :1,  p < :05,  p < :01
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Table 2.11: Local average treatment e¤ect: intensive margin
Grade Overall By Treatment Asked to Raise
Set Goal 0.072
(0.088)
Set Goal T: Goal 0.251
(0.096)
Set Goal T: Raise -0.146
(0.117)
Asked to Raise -0.409
(0.292)
Controls yes yes yes
Instruments T. assignment T. assignment R. assignment
Observations 854 854 408
Tutorgroups 77 77 47
R2 0.614 0.617 0.631
Standard errors in parentheses.
 p < :1,  p < :05,  p < :01
2.6.3 Extensive margin
The results above indicate a positive e¤ect of the goal treatment on course per-
formance for those who complete the course. Di¤erences between the total e¤ect
estimates and the estimates on the intensive margin may be due to selection e¤ects
induced by the treatments. For instance, our treatments may a¤ect course com-
pletion by creating greater commitment. To study the e¤ects of our treatments on
course completion we estimate a linear probability model in much the same way as
above. Given that students have to attend at least 10 out of 13 tutorial sessions we
limit our estimation to the sample of students who attended at least 3 sessions such
that all students were still able to meet this requirement by the time the treatment
took place. In the control group 6.2 percent (24) of the students having attended at
least 3 sessions dropped out of the course. This dropout rate is lowered by 2 percent-
age points on average in the goal treatment as can be seen in Table 2.12 providing
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the intention to treat estimates on the dropout rate.23 The results on the dropout
rate are similar to those on course performance given course completion in that the
goal treatment again has an e¤ect whereas the raise treatment does not have an
e¤ect but has an oppositely signed coe¢ cient. In contrast to the e¤ect on the course
grade however, the reduction in dropouts is concentrated among men rather than
women. This is most likely due to the fact that women have a substantially lower
baseline dropout rate than men (6.8% for men compared to 2.8% for women in the
control group, two-sided p-value 0.12).
Table 2.12: Intention to treat e¤ect: dropout
Dropout Overall Excl. 7 mentors Male Female
T: Goal -0.020 -0.029 -0.0215 -0.016
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014)
T: Raise 0.005 0.0005 0.00002 0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 955 868 678 277
Tutorgroups 84 77 84 81
R2 0.169 0.183 0.175 0.269
Standard errors in parentheses.
 p < :1,  p < :05,  p < :01
The pattern that the goal treatment has desirable e¤ects while the raise treatment
has undesirable e¤ects continues to hold when considering the e¤ect on those who
actually set goals as shown in Table 2.13. Those in the goal treatment who actually
set a goal show a 3.7 percentage point lower dropout rate than those in either the
control or the raise treatment. Among those students who set a goal, those who are
asked to raise their goal are 12 percentage points more likely to drop out than those
who are not asked to raise their goal. Even taking into account that the comparison
group consists of students with a lower dropout rate of 3.9 percentage point due
to the e¤ect of setting a goal itself on the dropout rate discussed above this is a
sizeable e¤ect. This result shows that attempts to raise a students goal in order
to improve performance can backre by leading to a substantially lower chance of
course completion.
23No estimates on subsamples for the Dutch and international programmes are provided as there
are too few dropouts from the international programmes, resulting in collinearity.
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Table 2.13: Local average treatment e¤ect: dropout
Dropout Overall By Treatment Asked to Raise
Set Goal -0.020
(0.008)
Set Goal T: Goal -0.037
(0.010)
Set Goal T: Raise 0.0005
(0.010)
Asked to Raise 0.120
(0.017)
Controls yes yes yes
Instruments T. assignment T. assignment R. assignment
Observations 868 868 416
Tutorgroups 77 77 47
R2 0.176 0.183 0.214
Standard errors in parentheses.
 p < :1,  p < :05,  p < :01
2.6.4 Further results
In this section we present a number of additional analyses that shed light on further
questions. To start, we consider whether there is a heterogeneous e¤ect of treatment
due to di¤erences in ability. We measure ability by taking the average of the grades
achieved in the rst block, and centering this grade average by subtracting the overall
mean average score of 6.2 (std. dev. 1.65). We then interact the ability measure
with studentstreatment assignment. The intention-to-treat estimates in Table 2.14
show that students who performed better in previous courses respond less to the
goal treatment. Thus our intervention had a stronger e¤ect on weaker students than
it did on top students. There is no such heterogeneous e¤ect regarding the raise
treatment.24
24For students who attended a Dutch high school we also have high school grades. If we use
high school grades (as a measure of ability) for this subsample we nd a qualitatively similar result
but a decrease in power because of the smaller sample size.
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Second, as we have seen above, students set higher goals in front of a female
mentor (two-sided p-value of 0.012). This suggests that the motivation to set a goal
may di¤er depending on the gender of the mentor. It is thus natural to ask whether
our treatments have heterogeneous e¤ects depending on the mentors gender. Overall
there is no sign of a heterogeneous treatment e¤ect depending on the gender of the
administering mentor as shown in Table 2.15.
The desire to impress a member of the opposite gender may result in a hetero-
geneous treatment e¤ect based on the gender combination of mentor and student.
Estimates on male or female students reveal no such signicant interaction e¤ect,
although the signs of the point estimates do conict in the expected manner which
is consistent with such an e¤ect. In the subsample of Dutch students there is a clear
interaction e¤ect of gender on treatment response. The point estimates suggest that
having a female mentor completely reverses the e¤ect of the treatments such that
the raise treatment has an insignicant negative impact when administered by a
male mentor but a positive impact when administered by a female mentor (p-value
of di¤erence between male and female mentor administering the raise treatment is
0.002). Male and female mentors have the same e¤ect on Dutch programme students
in the goal treatment. Furthermore, no gender di¤erences are found in the sample
of international students, although this may be due to a lack of power.
Another possible channel through which treatment may be a¤ected is the ex-
perience of the mentor. More experienced mentors may project more authority or
may be better able to t the treatment into the conversation in a natural manner.
A heterogeneous treatment e¤ect based on the mentors experience may also speak
to a possible channel through which setting a goal in the individual mentor-student
meeting a¤ects performance. If students care for their reputation in the eyes of
their mentor they may value this reputation more if the mentor is more experienced.
Taken combined, we expect more experienced mentors to strengthen the treatment
e¤ects. Recall however that we have already seen some evidence speaking against a
better implementation of the treatments by more experienced mentors in the form
of a weakly lower rate of inducement (two-sided p-value of 0.06) and goals that are
approximately three tenths of a point lower.
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The estimation results including a heterogeneous e¤ect for experienced mentors
is given in Table 2.16. We see that more experienced mentors do not have a sig-
nicant positive impact on the raise treatment overall. Men in the goal treatment
with a more experienced mentor show an increase in performance whereas there is
no such increase in performance when they have an inexperienced mentor. Female
students in the goal treatment seem to do worse with an experienced mentor com-
pared to an unexperienced mentor, although this e¤ect is not signicant. This may
suggest that men respond more to authority. Although there appears to be a sig-
nicant negative interaction e¤ect of mentor experience on assignment to the goal
treatment for international students, the e¤ect of having a more experienced mentor
implementing the treatment is no di¤erent from that of an unexperienced mentor
(p-value of 0.21). These results show that generally the students do not appear to
be more responsive to more experienced mentors. Although we suggested that stu-
dents might be more responsive to a more experienced mentor due to reputational
concerns, this nding does not discredit the reputation explanation for why goals
can improve performance. For instance, students may not distinguish that much
between di¤erent mentors, or value their reputation in the eyes of their mentor more
based on other factors such as the mentors own ability.
We are fully aware that there are two di¤erent e¤ects of setting a goal in our goal
treatment. The e¤ect of thinking about a goal and setting a goal for oneself, and
the e¤ect of sharing this goal with the mentor. Thinking about a goal may create a
reference point with which to compare ones performance as posited in the literature.
This may result in higher performance by giving positive utility if the goal is met
or exceeded and negative utility if performance falls short. Sharing the goal with
the mentor may result in reputational concerns towards the mentor, in the sense
that the mentor may evaluate the student based on her performance relative to her
goal. Empirically our best way to learn whether sharing the goal with the mentor
leads to the increased performance, is by considering when reputational concerns
are likely to be stronger and comparing students in those situations with similar
students who face weaker reputational concerns. We posit two such situations, facing
a more experienced mentor who is likely better in evaluating students performance,
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and facing a mentor of the opposite gender who may be more valuable to impress.
For neither of these situations we nd a heterogeneous impact on the treatment
e¤ect, suggesting that goals primarily work through creating a reference point for
oneself. Of course our proxies may not capture enough variation in the strength of
reputational concerns.
Furthermore, asking students to raise their goal can have e¤ects through two
di¤erent channels. The challenge of the goal itself can have an e¤ect, i.e. if students
get utility from reaching a goal they may exert additional e¤ort if the goal becomes
more challenging. Another channel is that asking the student to raise her goal can
give the student information about her ability. Depending on the substitutability
or complementarity of ability and e¤ort this can lead to a decrease or increase in
e¤ort and performance. Here too, our best way to deal with this is comparing the
treatment e¤ects for students with experienced mentors with the treatment e¤ects for
students with unexperienced mentors. The reason is that we expect that students
who have experienced mentors expect their mentor to be more able to know the
students ability, and hence the information aspect is stronger. We nd that there
is no signicant di¤erence in treatment e¤ects for students who have experienced
and unexperienced mentors. This implies that either the information component is
small, or that there is not much heterogeneity in the extend to which the message
contains information by experience of the mentor.
We nd a consistent pattern in our data that female students respond stronger
to our treatments than male students. At rst sight this may seem surprising. There
is a very rich literature on heterogeneous gender e¤ects to monetary incentives and
non-monetary incentives when there is a competition element. Many papers nd
that males respond stronger to competitive incentives or information about their
(relative) ranking, see for example Gneezy et al. (2003), Barankay (2011), and
Niederle and Vesterlund (2011), while others nd that there is no gender di¤erence,
see Dreber et al. (2011) and Delfgaauw et al. (2013). An important di¤erence
between these incentives and the incentives in our treatments is that goal setting
in this experiment does not have any competitive element, which might drive the
gender e¤ect in the current literature.
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Finally, a potential concern of goal setting in multitasking environments is that
goals lead subjects away from other (non-incentivized) tasks. Our students take one
other course at the same time as microeconomics. Doing our previous analyses with
the other courses grade as a dependent variable shows that there is no evidence of
such a substitution e¤ect (these results are available on request). Hence, the positive
e¤ect of goal setting in this study is a net increase in performance.
2.7 Discussion and conclusion
We conducted a eld experiment in order to test the e¤ects of encouraging students
to set goals and encouraging students to increase the ambitiousness of their goals
during mentor-student meetings in a university study programme. We designed two
treatments. In the goal treatment we instructed mentors to encourage students to set
a grade specic goal. In the raise treatment we gave mentors the same instruction
and in addition instructed them to raise this goal if deemed appropriate.
We nd that students in the goal treatment perform better than students in the
control group. Students whose mentor was assigned to the goal treatment score 0.16
gradepoints (i.e. 9.3% of a standard deviation) higher than students in the control
group. Students in the raise treatment perform similarly to students in the control
group, although there are some indications that their performance is even lower.
This is true in terms of both the dropout rate and the grades achieved that are
conditional on completing the course. The null e¤ect of the raise treatment is in line
with the goal becoming unacceptable due to the raise, indicating that the size of the
raise was too high. Finally, being asked to raise the goal leads to a signicant drop
in performance as compared to similar students in the goal treatment.
An alternative explanation for the result that students in the raise treatment
perform worse than students in the goal treatment is the nature of the goal. While
in the goal treatment students set themselves a goal, a proposal to raise this self-set
goal can be seen as a goal of a di¤erent kind, namely a cooperatively set goal (or even
an assigned goal). Changing the nature of the goal can change the commitment of
the student to the goal (see Hollenbeck et al. 1989), which implies that the intrinsic
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motivation (i.e. the utility gain when reaching the goal) changes between the two
treatments. As a consequence students perform worse in the raise treatment than
in the goal treatment. Further, if some students in the control group set themselves
a goal then this could even lead to a lower performance of students in the raise
treatment as compared to the control group.25
Next, we looked at heterogeneous treatment e¤ects. First, we nd that students
that performed poorly prior to the experiment benet most from setting goals. Sec-
ond, we expected stronger e¤ects for students who are assigned to more experienced
mentors. The reason for this is that we expect experienced mentors to be better
able to incorporate our treatments in their meetings, and because these mentors
might have more authority. We nd that overall there is no heterogeneous e¤ect of
experience on the treatments. There is an e¤ect on male students suggesting male
students are more a¤ected by authority. This however does not imply that overall
reputational concerns of students towards their mentor do not play a role, as stu-
dents may care more about (unobservable) characteristics other than experience of
their mentor. Third, studentsmotivation to set a goal might di¤er by the gender of
their mentor, as well as whether student and mentor are of the same gender. Overall
we nd that there is no e¤ect of a mentors gender on the treatment e¤ects. More
surprisingly, if we focus only on the students in Dutch education programmes, we see
that the students assigned to the raise treatment perform better when their mentor
is female, and worse when their mentor is male as compared to the control group.
This might indicate that female mentors are more able to motivate the initially less
motivated students by challenging them than male mentors.
To summarize we have shown that students setting and sharing goals with their
mentors can help raise study performance, and more so for initially poorly performing
students. We have furthermore shown that although it may be tempting to try to
push students to raise the bar a bit higher, raising the bar can be more demotivating
than inspiring. Hence, one should be cautious in attempting to push students beyond
what they themselves aim to achieve, even if that bar appears to be low.
It is interesting to learn whether these results are generalizable to other settings,
25Our nding that 55% of students that are asked about goals already have a goal in mind
supports this idea.
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for example manager-worker settings. Our ndings may have implications for the
optimal design of appraisal interviews. In order to generalize our ndings we need
more (experimental) evidence in other settings.
Finally, our paper is (relatively) silent on the mechanisms that drive goal setting.
It is interesting to learn to what extent present bias preferences and loss aversion,
as is posited in economic theory papers as important drivers that make goals work,
are predictors of the success of goal setting. For example our result that goal setting
works mostly for initially poor performing students may be explained by poor per-
forming students having stronger present bias preferences, are more loss averse, or
by the fact that extra e¤ort more easily increases performance when initial perfor-
mance is low. One way to test how the e¤ect of goal setting on performance interacts
with peoples present bias preferences and loss aversion is by running a laboratory
experiment with a sample of the students that participated in this study.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Appendix
Dear X,
Following our introduction during the tutor instruction session, we request you to
adjust the progress meetings with your students. Your participation contributes to
research regarding the possibilities to increase studentsstudy success by improving
the tutor meetings.
The instructions regarding the progress meetings that you conduct in the week
of 17th to 21st November follow.
After you have discussed the general motivation and study progress of the stu-
dent, you are expected to ask some additional questions while discussing the current
courses the student follows. These questions relate to Microeconomics. The inten-
tion is to motivate the students to set a goal. Ask the questions in italics.
Do you have a nal grade in mind that you want to achieve for Microeconomics?
If YES: What grade do you want to achieve?
(if the student answers: I want to pass the course, then try to specify this, for
example: Are you aiming for 5,5 or a 6?)
If NO: Some students nd it useful to set concrete goals in the form of a grade.
Setting a goal can help motivate you to perform better. Do you want to set yourself
a goal?
If YES: What nal grade do you want to achieve for Microeconomics?
If NO: continue the conversation as usual.
If the student set a goal:
Good luck with achieving your goal.
It is important that you follow the instructions as much as possible. However,
do try to incorporate the questions into the conversation naturally. Attached, you
nd a owchart summarizing the script. You can use this owchart to refresh your
memory prior to the meeting.
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We request you to complete the attached form after the meeting with each stu-
dent. You can print this form yourself, or pick up a copy at H8-23 or H8-24. It can
be useful to make notes. Please, read the form carefully before the meetings.
After the meetings we would like to receive the completed forms. The completed
forms can be handed in at H8-23 or H8-24 or can be emailed to vanlent@ese.eur.nl or
souverijn@ese.eur.nl. We request that you hand in the form at Friday 28th November
at the latest.
For research purposes we request that you do not discuss these instructions with
others.
If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact us. You can nd us in
H8-23 or H8-24, and you can reach us at vanlent@ese.eur.nl, phone: 010 408 1793
or souverijn@ese.eur.nl, phone: 010 408 9038.
Max van Lent
Michiel Souverijn
P.S. Could you please conrm to us by email that you have received this email
and that you have read the instructions.
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2.A.2 Appendix
Dear X,
Following our introduction during the tutor instruction session, we request you to
adjust the progress meetings with your students. Your participation contributes to
research regarding the possibilities to increase studentsstudy success by improving
the tutor meetings.
The instructions regarding the progress meetings that you conduct in the week
of 17th to 21st November follow.
After you have discussed the general motivation and study progress of the stu-
dent, you are expected to ask some additional questions while discussing the current
courses the student follows. These questions relate to Microeconomics. The inten-
tion is to motivate the students to set a goal. Ask the questions in italics.
Do you have a nal grade in mind that you want to achieve for Microeconomics?
If YES: What grade do you want to achieve?
(if the student answers: I want to pass the course, then try to specify this, for
example: Are you aiming for 5,5 or a 6?)
If NO: Some students nd it useful to set concrete goals in the form of a grade.
Setting a goal can help motivate you to perform better. Do you want to set yourself
a goal?
If YES: What nal grade do you want to achieve for Microeconomics?
If NO: continue the conversation as usual.
If you (as a tutor) think the goal (grade) set is achievable:
Shouldnt you set a higher goal and aim for a [grade +1]? [So if the student
chooses a 6 as a goal and you think this is achievable, propose to aim for a 7.]
If the student set a goal:
Good luck with achieving your goal.
It is important that you follow the instructions as much as possible. However,
do try to incorporate the questions into the conversation naturally. Attached, you
nd a owchart summarizing the script. You can use this owchart to refresh your
memory prior to the meeting.
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We request you to complete the attached form after the meeting with each stu-
dent. You can print this form yourself, or pick up a copy at H8-23 or H8-24. It can
be useful to make notes. Please, read the form carefully before the meetings.
After the meetings we would like to receive the completed forms. The completed
forms can be handed in at H8-23 or H8-24 or can be emailed to vanlent@ese.eur.nl or
souverijn@ese.eur.nl. We request that you hand in the form at Friday 28th November
at the latest.
For research purposes we request that you do not discuss these instructions with
others.
If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact us. You can nd us in
H8-23 or H8-24, and you can reach us at vanlent@ese.eur.nl, phone: 010 408 1793
or souverijn@ese.eur.nl, phone: 010 408 9038.
Max van Lent
Michiel Souverijn
P.S. Could you please conrm to us by email that you have received this email
and that you have read the instructions.
Chapter 3
Serving the Public Interest in
Several Ways: Theory and
Empirics
Joint with Robert Dur
3.1 Introduction
Many people feel a need to serve the public interest or to increase the well-being of
others, even of complete strangers. Andreoni and Miller (2002) study such altruistic
preferences in the lab and nd that a majority of people are willing to spend some
money (anonymously) in order to increase the well-being of unknown others.1 In
practice, two common ways of serving the public interest are making a donation to
charity and taking a job that involves helping others. Both these altruistic behaviors
are prevalent in modern societies. List and Price (2012) report data showing that in
rich countries typically more than half of the population make donations to charity.
Data from the International Social Survey (2005) suggest that a sizeable majority
of people aspire and many of them have a job in which they can increase the
well-being of others.
In this paper we develop a coherent framework to study the role of altruistic
1See also Beckman et al. (2002) and Falk et al. (2005), among others.
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preferences in job choice, on-the-job e¤ort provision, and charitable donations. We
set up a simple theoretical model, and subsequently test the models predictions
using rich survey data. In our model, people di¤er in their altruism and can serve
the public interest in two ways: by making a charitable donation and by taking
a public service job and exerting e¤ort on the job. People make three decisions:
whether to take a public service job or a regular job, how much e¤ort to exert at
work, and how much of their income to donate to charity.
Our theoretical analysis yields the following predictions. First, as in related
models that we discuss below, the likelihood of having a public service job (weakly)
increases in a workers altruism. The reason is that holding a public service job
gives opportunities to contribute to the well-being of others at relatively low cost,
which is appreciated by and hence attracts altruistic workers. Second, and quite
naturally, for a given job type, charitable donations (weakly) increase in workers
altruism. Third, and perhaps more surprising, for a given altruism and income,
workers holding a regular job donate more to charity than workers holding a public
service job. The intuition behind this result is that public service workers already
contribute to the well-being of others by exerting e¤ort on the job and, hence, by a
substitution argument, they donate less.
Our study is related to a rapidly expanding theoretical literature in economics
studying self-selection and workplace behavior of intrinsically motivated workers, see
for example Francois (2000, 2007), Besley and Ghatak (2005), Prendergast (2007),
Delfgaauw and Dur (2007, 2008), Brekke and Nyborg (2008), Dal Bó et al. (2013),
Dur and Zoutenbier (2015), Manna (2015), Cassar (2016a), and Barigozzi and Burani
(2016). In many of these studies, intrinsic motivation takes the form of altruism. We
enrich this literature by allowing workers to serve the public interest in several ways
not only by exerting e¤ort on certain types of jobs, but also by making charitable
donations.
Our theoretical predictions point to a possible aw in the empirical literature.
Numerous public administration scholars and several economists have examined
whether workers in some sectors or job types are more altruistic than in others
(see Perry et al. 2010 and Perry and Vandenabeele 2015 for overviews). Many of
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these studies measure a workers altruistic preferences using data on the workers
behavior outside the workplace, among others on the workers donations to charity
(e.g. Brewer 2003, Houston 2006, Rotolo and Wilson 2006, and Lee 2012). Our the-
ory suggests that this measure is awed and leads to an underestimation of altruism
of workers in public service jobs. Indeed, our theory does not rule out that workers
in public service jobs on average donate less to charity than workers in regular jobs
do, and yet are more altruistic. This is particularly likely when public service jobs
o¤er ample opportunities to serve the public interest, such that workers in those jobs
feel less of a need to make further contributions outside the workplace.2
We empirically examine our predictions using data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (SOEP). The SOEP is a representative longitudinal study
covering 30,000 persons in 11,000 households. It contains questions about individ-
uals education, earnings, employment, personality characteristics, and behavior.
The key variables that we use for our analysis are self-reported altruism, money
donations to charity, and job type or sector of employment. Following Becker et
al. (2012) and Dur and Zoutenbier (2015), we measure a workers altruism by his
response to the question: How important do you nd it to be there for others cur-
rently?Donations to charity are measured by the response to the question: Did
you donate money last year (not counting membership fees)?If the answer to this
question is yes, the respondent is asked to report the total amount donated. Lastly,
in line with the literature, we use several denitions of what a public service job
exactly is.3
2See Buurman et al. (2012) and Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2015) for related, though less precise,
arguments. Another related paper is the recent study by Aldashev et al. (2016) that examines
rent extraction, charitable donations, and self-selection of altruistic and selsh managers into for-
prot and not-for-prot organizations, and nds that multiple equilibria may arise. Our theory
also relates to the literature on moral licensing in social psychology, which posits that people tend
to take immoral decisions following past good deeds (see Merritt et al. (2010) for a recent review).
3In the literature there is no agreement on what a public service job exactly is. Following Perry
and Wise (1990)s concept of public service motivation, many papers compare workers employed
in the public sector with those employed in the private sector, for example Vandenabeele (2008),
Steijn (2008), and Christensen and Wright (2011). Other papers also compare workers employed in
di¤erent industries or job types, see for example Gregg et al. (2011), Houston (2011), Christensen
and Wright (2011), and Kjeldsen and Jacobsen (2013). In our empirical work we use two denitions.
First, we dene public service jobs as jobs in the public sector and regular jobs as jobs in the private
sector. Later, we dene public service jobs as jobs in certain industries (health, sport and education,
and public administration) and regular jobs as jobs in the remaining industries. The results we
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Consistent with our theory, we nd that workers who are more altruistic are more
likely to take a public service job and, for a given job type, donate a higher amount
to charity. Furthermore, we nd that workers in a regular job make signicantly
higher donations to charity than equally altruistic workers in a public service job.
However, this di¤erence moves close to zero and becomes statistically insignicant
when we control for income. Moreover, the result turns out to be sensitive to the
exact denition of a public service job and the estimation method.
Studying workerscharitable behavior and self-selection into jobs is interesting in
itself as well as relevant from a policy perspective. Studies like ours contribute to the
body of knowledge about the prevalence of work motivations in di¤erent job types
and sectors, which can be used when designing HR-policies. Moreover, as our study
provides insights into the drivers of charitable donations, our results may be useful
for charitable organizations in designing and targeting their promotion activities.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
develop and analyze our theoretical model and derive predictions. In Section 3 we
describe the data and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents our empirical results.
Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Theory
3.2.1 Model
We develop a model where workers take three decisions: they choose between a
regular job (s = 0) and a public service job (s = 1), how much e¤ort to exert on
the job (es;i  0), and how much of their income to donate to charity (ds;i  0).
Workers are heterogeneous in two ways. First, they di¤er in their altruism denoted
by i. We assume altruism is impure, as in Andreoni (1990). That is, a worker
receives a warm-glowutility from making a contribution to the well-being of others,
but he does not directly care about others utility. This approach is in line with
earlier related models such as Besley and Ghatak (2005), Delfgaauw and Dur (2008),
obtain are roughly the same.
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Dur and Zoutenbier (2015), and Aldashev et al. (2016).4 Tonin and Vlassopoulos
(2010) provide eld-experimental evidence supporting this assumption. The altruism
parameter i follows a continuous uniform distribution with boundaries [0; ] with
 > 0. Second, workers di¤er in a xed benet (or cost) from choosing a public
service job, denoted by "i. This variable is meant to represent worker is preference
for job aspects other than those stressed by our theory, such as commuting time,
pension plans, and other job (dis)amenities. "i is drawn from a continuous uniform
distribution with boundaries ["; "] where " < 0 < ". We shall assume a su¢ ciently
rich type space (su¢ ciently low " and su¢ ciently high "), so that in equilibrium any
possible altruism type i is present in both types of jobs.
A workers utility depends on his private consumption, on his cost of e¤ort,
the xed benet or cost "i when working in a public service job (s = 1), and if
the worker is altruistic (i > 0) on his contribution to the well-being of others.
More specically, we assume that worker is utility increases linearly in his private
consumption, that his e¤ort costs are quadratic, and that his altruistic utilityis
log-linear in his contributions to the well-being of others:5
Ui(ds;i; es;i) = ws;i   ds;i   1
2
e2s;i + i ln(ds;i + ses;i) + s"i;
where ws;i denotes worker is wage when working in sector s, private consumption is
the di¤erence between the workers wage (ws;i) and his donation to charity (ds;i  0),
the parameter  is a measure for the cost of e¤ort, and s is the e¤ect of a unit of
e¤ort in job s on the well-being of others. For simplicity, we assume 0 = 0 and
1 > 0. That is, only e¤ort in a public service job increases the well-being of others,
while e¤ort in a regular job does not. However, our key predictions are similar
if on-the-job e¤ort would increase the well-being of others in all jobs but more so
in public service jobs. Besides exerting e¤ort in a public service job, workers can
serve the public interest by donating money to charity, and we assume that these
4For an overview of theoretical papers applying di¤erent types of altruism, see Francois and
Vlassopoulos (2008).
5The linearity of utility in private consumption implies that we abstract from income e¤ects.
This greatly simplies the analysis without missing out on important insights. In the empirics, we
run analyses with and without controlling for income.
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two instruments are substitutes. For convenience, we assume that they are perfect
substitutes.6 Furthermore, we assume that workers are paid for performance in
regular jobs, while workers receive a at wage in a public service job. More precisely,
wages in regular and public service jobs equal w0 = a+xe0 and w1 = z, respectively,
where x equals the marginal product of e¤ort of workers in a regular job (assuming
perfect competition in the labor market) and z is such that the demand for public
services equals the supply of those services provided by workers in public service
jobs in equilibrium. The assumption of at wages in public service jobs is in line
with the stylized fact that pay is typically less dependent on performance in those
jobs.7 Our key predictions need not change if we allow for performance pay in all
jobs.
The timing of the events is as follows. First, nature draws each workers i and
"i. Second, workers choose either a regular or a public service job. Finally, workers
choose their e¤ort and donations.
3.2.2 Analysis
We solve the model by backward induction and rst derive the on-the-job e¤ort and
charitable donations a worker chooses for a given job type. Next, we will analyze
which worker types, in terms of i and "i, sort into which job type. Along the way,
we will formulate predictions that will be empirically examined in Section 4.
If worker i has a regular job (s = 0), his optimization problem reads
max
e0;i;d0;i
a+ xe0;i   d0;i   1
2
e20;i + i ln(d0;i).
Optimal e¤ort e0;i  0 and optimal donations d0;i  0, are found by simultaneously
6Volunteering is another important way to serve the public interest. We abstract from vol-
unteering in our analysis, because volunteering can have meaningful private returns in the labor
market as well, see e.g. the eld-experimental evidence in Baert and Vuji´c (2016) and the references
therein. Yeomans and Al-Ubaydli (2016) study the relation between volunteering for and making
charitable donations to the same non-prot rm and nd some evidence for substitutability.
7For example, Burgess and Metcalfe (1999) report that incentive pay is more prevalent in
private sector jobs than in public sector jobs. Likewise, in the education industry, pay is generally
based on experience and academic degrees and not on e¤ort or performance, see e.g. Podgursky
(2007).
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solving the following rst-order conditions:
@U()
@e0;i
= x  e0;i = 0;
@U()
@d0;i
=  1 + i
d0;i
= 0;
which results in:
e0;i =
x

; (3.1)
d0;i = i: (3.2)
Hence, workers with a regular job all exert the same level of e¤ort, independent of
their altruistic preferences. Altruistic workers with a regular job donate a part of
their income to charity, and the more so the stronger their altruistic preferences.
Selsh workers (those with i = 0) would like to extract money from charities
(d0;i < 0), but the non-negativity constraint naturally prevents this, and so their
donations equal zero.
If worker i has a public service job, his optimization problem reads
max
e1;i;d1;i
z   d1;i   1
2
e21;i + i ln(d1;i + 1e1;i) + "i.
Optimal e¤ort e1;i  0 and optimal charitable donations d1;i  0 are found by
simultaneously solving the rst-order conditions:
@U()
@e1;i
=  e1;i +
i1
d1;i + 1e

1;i
= 0;
@U()
@d1;i
=  1 + i
d1;i + 1e

1;i
= 0;
which gives after solving:
if i 
21

) e1;i =
r
i

and d1;i = 0; (3.3)
if i >
21

) e1;i =
1

and d1;i = i  
21

. (3.4)
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Clearly, not all of the altruistic workers in a public service job make donations to
charity. Those with altruism lower than or equal to 21= only exert e¤ort and do
not supplement it by making charitable donations. The reason for this is that, up
to some point, exerting e¤ort on the job is a less costly way to serve the public
interest than making charitable donations. Consequently, workers with relatively
low levels of altruism will only make use of this less costly instrument, and the
more so, the more altruistic the worker is. When work e¤ort reaches a critical level,
making charitable donations becomes the less costly option at the margin. As a
result, workers whose altruism is higher than 21= use both e¤ort and donations
to serve the public interest. Note that starting at the treshold level of altruism
of 21=, higher altruism results in an increase in donations, while e¤ort remains
the same. Thus, as compared to models where people can only serve the public
interest through on-the-job e¤ort, we nd that adding the option to make charitable
donations truncates e¤ort for public service jobs. Note that the level at which e¤ort
is truncated critically depends on the e¤ectiveness of e¤ort as compared to that
of charitable donations, as measured by 1. Clearly, when on-the-job e¤ort is more
e¤ective in raising the well-being of others, e¤ort plays a bigger role at the expense of
charitable donations. Lastly, note that (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4) imply that, for a given
altruism, a workers charitable donations are always higher when holding a regular
job as compared to holding a public service job. The reverse holds, however, for total
contributions to the public interest (d+ e) for workers with altruism smaller than
21=. The intuition is that workers with a public service job can contribute to the
public interest at a lower cost, and hence contribute more. For workers with altruism
equal to or higher than 21=, total contributions are similar across job types for a
given level of altruism. The reason is that, for those workers, the marginal costs
of charitable donations drives their total contribution, which is independent of job
type.
The choices that workers make are depicted in Figure 3.1.
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In Section 4, we will empirically examine the following predictions regarding
workers charitable donations:
Prediction 1: For a given job, charitable donations (weakly) increase in a
workers altruism.
Prediction 2: For a given workers altruism, charitable donations are higher
when holding a regular job as compared to when holding a public service job.
We shall examine whether these predictions nd support in the data, with and
without controlling for workers income in the regressions.
Now that we have analyzed the behavior of workers in a given job type, we
examine which worker types sort into which job type. Substituting (3.1) and (3.2)
into the utility function gives, after some rewriting, the utility derived from taking
a regular job:
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Ui(d0;i; e0;i) = a+
x2
2
  i + i ln(i):
Workers taking a public service job attain utility:
Ui(d1;i; e1;i) = z   i
2
+ i ln(1
r
i

) + "i when i 
21

;
Ui(d1;i; e1;i) = z +
21
2
  i + i ln(i) + "i when i >
21

;
which follows from substituting (3.3) and (3.4) into the utility function. Comparing
the utilities attained in a regular and public service job, it follows that workers with
i  21= choose a public service job if:
z   a  1
2
x2

+
1
2
i + i ln

1
r
i


  i ln(i) + "i  0: (3.5)
There is an interior solution for any possible -type if " is su¢ ciently large and
" is su¢ ciently low. It is also straightforward to derive that the left-hand side of
the inequality increases with i. Hence, for workers whose altruism is smaller than
or equal to 21=, it holds that those with stronger altruistic preferences are more
likely to choose a public service job. The intuition is that a public service job o¤ers
an opportunity to serve the public interest at a relatively low cost, which is more
attractive for workers with stronger altruistic preferences as they make more use of
it. For workers with i > 
2
1=, we nd that they prefer a public service job if:
z   a+ 
2
1
2
  x
2
2
+ "i  0: (3.6)
Hence, for these highly altruistic workers, the attractiveness of a public service job
does not increase with the workers altruism. The reason is that all workers within
this group use the opportunity to serve the public interest on the job to the same
extent, see equation (3.4) above. Hence, the probability of choosing a public service
job does not further increase with altruism starting at i = 
2
1=.
The preferences for job type are depicted in Figure 3.2.
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In equilibrium, the wage for public service jobs z will be such that supply of and
demand for services are equal:
Z
0
"Z
"()
r
i

f("; )d"d +
Z

"Z
"()
1

f("; )d"d = D
where "() is the relation resulting from condition (3.5) holding with equality, f("; )
is the probability density function, and D represents the demand for public services
measured in units of e¤ort (which may well depend on the cost per unit, but is
assumed to be constant here for convenience). Without loss of generality, we assume
a mass of workers equal to unity. Note that when z goes up, "() goes down, implying
an increase in supply.
The prediction that will be studied in the next sections resulting from the analysis
of job choice above is:
Prediction 3: Workers who are more altruistic are (weakly) more likely to
choose a public service job.
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3.3 Data and empirical strategy
We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP).8 The SOEP is
an unbalanced panel which contains survey questions about employment, earnings,
preferences, and personality measures among others (see Wagner et al. 2007). Our
key variables of interest are self-reported monetary donations to charity, altruistic
preferences, and job type or sector of employment. We measure charitable donations
by the response to the question: "Did you donate money last year (not counting
membership fees)?"9 The respondents who answered this question with "yes" were
subsequently asked how much money they donated in total. Following Becker et
al. (2012) and Dur and Zoutenbier (2015), we measure altruistic preferences by
the respondents answer to the question: "How important are the following things
[being there for others] currently for you?" Answers are given on a four point scale,
ranging from "not at all important" to "very important". Finally, we allow for
two distinct denitions of what regular and public service jobs are. We start with
dening public service jobs as jobs in the public sector and regular jobs as jobs in
the private sector.10 Next, we dene public service jobs as jobs in certain industries
(health, sport and education, and public administration) and regular jobs as jobs in
the remaining industries. We exclude all people without a job from our sample.
One may be sceptical about the reliability of the questionnaire data we use, par-
ticularly about the self-reported altruistic preferences and donations. For instance,
it might well be that people paint a too rosy picture of their altruistic preferences
and their generosity. Even worse, such misrepresentation may correlate with job
type. Recent ndings from an incentivized experiment by Abeler et al. (2014), how-
ever, suggest that we should not be too sceptical about self-reported data. They
nd among a representative sample of the German population that participants
forego considerable amounts of money to avoid lying.11 Moreover, lying appears to
8Detailed information about the SOEP can be found at http://www.diw.de/en/soep.
9In the questionnaire, it is further stated that "We understand donations here as giving money
for social, church, cultural, community, and charitable aims, without receiving any direct compen-
sation in return. These donations can be large sums of money but also smaller sums, for example,
the change one puts into a collection box. We also count church o¤erings."
10It is not possible to distinguish between for-prot and not-for-prot employers in the private
sector. This likely results in a downward bias in our estimates.
11See also Abeler et al. (2016) who use data from 72 experimental studies and nd that people
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be uncorrelated with sector of employment (personal communication with Johannes
Abeler). Relatedly, Falk et al. (2016) examine the predictive power of survey ques-
tions for incentivized choices and nd a sizeable correlation of 0.4 between stated
and revealed willingness to donate part of a windfall gain to a charity.
We restrict our analysis to the year 2010, because this is the only year in which
the question about charitable donations is included in the survey. The question that
measures a respondents altruism is taken from the 2008 wave, which is the most
recent wave that includes this question. We have a sample of 7,527 respondents of
which 26.2% is employed in the public sector and the remaining 73.8% is employed
in the private sector (the corresponding gures for the alternative denition of a
public service job are 33.0% and 67.0%).
To examine whether there is support for our predictions, we run an ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression with money donations to charity as the dependent
variable.12 Our main specication is:
C =  +   A+   S +   I +  X + ;
where C is the amount of charitable donations, A is a workers self-reported altruism,
S is a dummy variable that equals one if a worker has a public service job, I is
workers income, X is a vector of other control variables, and  is the residual. In
line with theoretical predictions 1 and 2, we expect that an increase in altruism
leads to an increase in donations ( > 0) and that, for a given altruism, having a
public service job instead of a regular job decreases donations ( < 0). While our
theoretical model abstracts from income e¤ects, we allow for those in the empirical
analysis by including the workers income. To examine theoretical prediction 3
regarding the altruism of workers with a public service job, we estimate the following
regression equation:
S =  +   A+   Z + !;
where S is a dummy variable equal to one if the worker has a public service job, A is
lie surprisingly little.
12As a robustness check, we also estimated a tobit model and a negative binomial regression
model, and found very noisy estimates with those models.
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the workers altruism, Z is a vector of other control variables, and ! is the residual.
In line with theoretical prediction 3 we expect that workersprobability to sort into
a public service job increases in altruism ( > 0). The specication we estimate is
identical to Dur and Zoutenbier (2015) who study the same issue using an earlier
wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel.
In Table 3.1 we display the descriptive statistics of our sample. Since in most of
our empirical analysis we compare public sector workers with private sector workers,
we distinguish between these two in the descriptive statistics as well. There are
several striking di¤erences between public and private sector workers. For instance,
the average donation made by public sector workers is 121.95 euros, while private
sector workers on average donate 107.37 euros. There is quite a bit of variation in
donations in both sectors. Public sector workers report to be more altruistic than
private sector workers, though the di¤erence in the average is small. Furthermore,
public sector workers are on average older, are more often female, and are much
higher educated than private sector workers. Also, public sector workers earn on
average a higher yearly income, while the standard deviation of their income is
much lower than the standard deviation of incomes in the private sector.
Table 3.2 shows the correlations between our variables of interest. Charitable
donations and altruism are positively correlated and the same is true for charitable
donations and public sector employment and for altruism and public sector employ-
ment. Figure 3.3 plots the average charitable donations by sector of employment and
altruism. Charitable donations tend to increase with a workers altruism. Moreover,
it turns out that, for a given altruism, public sector workers on average donate more
than private sector workers.13 While this runs counter to our theoretical predictions,
we should keep in mind that these are raw correlations, which do not control for im-
portant heterogeneity between public and private sector employees, among others
in education, gender, and income. To control for these, we now turn to regression
analysis.
13None of the respondents in the lowest altruism category (those who state that they nd it not
important at all to be there for others) donate any money to charity. Hence the lack of bars for
this category in Figure 3.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Total Public (26,2%) Private(73.8%)
Donations: mean 111.20 121.95 107.37
standard deviation 522.26 411.40 556.38
Altruism (1): % 0.2 0.2 0.2
Altruism (2): % 6.6 5.2 7.1
Altruism (3): % 68.9 69.1 68.9
Altruism (4): % 24.3 25.5 23.8
Altruism: mean 3.17 3.20 3.16
standard deviation 0.54 0.53 0.54
Age: mean 45.5 46.4 45.2
standard deviation 11.1 10.8 11.2
Female: % 48.8 56.3 46.1
Yearly income: mean 21287.17 23077.86 20650.17
standard deviation 17324.48 12535.22 18694.91
Nr. of children in HH: mean 0.55 0.50 0.57
standard deviation 0.87 0.84 0.88
Married: % 64.2 64.5 64.1
Single: % 22.2 20.8 22.7
Widowed: % 1.6 1.5 1.7
Divorced: % 9.8 10.9 9.4
Separated: % 2.2 2.3 2.1
Education: less than HS: % 7.1 5.5 7.7
Education: HS: % 63.0 47.3 68.6
Education: more than HS: % 29.9 47.2 23.7
Tenure: mean 12.4 15.7 11.2
standard deviation 10.6 11.7 9.9
Religion: other religion: % 0.3 0.3 0.2
Islamic: % 1.8 1.0 2.1
Protestant: % 30.9 33.3 30.1
Catholic: % 28.0 30.2 27.3
Other christian: % 1.9 1.5 2.0
Not religious: % 37.1 33.7 38.3
Observations 7527 1975 5552
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3.4 Results
Table 3.3 reports the results of regressing charitable donations (measured in euros)
on a workers altruism, sector of employment, and a rich set of demographics. We
include altruism in the most exible manner, i.e. we take up three dummies for
altruism categories 1, 2, and 4, while category 3 workers who answered they nd it
"important" to be there for othersforms the baseline category. We nd evidence
in line with predictions 1 and 2. That is, charitable donations increase with self-
reported altruism and, for a given level of altruism, public sector workers donate
signicantly less than private sector workers. The di¤erence is 32.51 euro, which is
close to 30% of mean donations. The second column of Table 3.3 adds the workers
income as a control in a very exible manner by taking up 10 dummies for income
categories. The estimates show a positive convex relation between donations and
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income. More importantly, controlling for income moves the coe¢ cient for public
sector employment close to zero. Clearly, without controlling for income, the public
sector dummy picked up that workers in the public sector make smaller donations
because they earn less than comparable others in the private sector. The coe¢ cient
for the lowest altruism category also moves quite a bit, though we should keep in
mind the very small number of observations in this category (see Table 3.1), implying
imprecise estimates. Many of the other control variables have the same sign and
are of similar size as compared to earlier studies. For example, highly educated
workers donate more than lower educated workers (cf. Bekker and Wiepking 2011),
though the di¤erence decreases with almost 40 percent when controlling for income.
Contrary to earlier studies, we dont nd that females donate more than males (cf.
Mesch et al. 2006). However, we should keep in mind that, in contrast to earlier
studies, our regressions control for self-reported altruism, which is strongly positively
correlated with gender (see Table 3.2).
Table 3.4 shows the same regressions using a di¤erent denition of a public service
job, namely jobs in the health industry, sport and education industry, and public
administration.14 The results are qualitatively the same, even though the coe¢ cient
for public service job is smaller and far from signicant even when we do not control
for income.
14The other industries are: Agriculture, Fisheries, Energy/Water, Mining, Chemicals,
Synthetics, Earth/Clay/Stone, Iron/Steel, Mechanical Engineering, Electiral Engineering,
Wood/Paper/Print, Clothing, Food, Construction, Wholesale, Trading Agents, Retail, Train Sys-
tem, Postal System, Other transport, Financial Institutions, Insurance, Restaurants, Service In-
dustries, Trash Removal, Legal Services, Other Services, Church, Private Household.
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Table 3.3: OLS regression comparing public and private sector workers.
Dependent variable: Donations
Public Sector -32.51** -1.57
(14.08) (13.52)
Altruism (1) -117.85 -81.55
(123.72) (117.47)
Altruism (2) -56.91** -58.86***
(24.02) (22.81)
Altruism (4) 29.88** 27.36**
(14.12) (13.40)
Age -13.68*** -13.43***
(3.94) (3.81)
Age*Age 0.21*** 0.20***
(0.04) (0.04)
No. of children in HH 25.13*** 16.35**
(7.94) (7.60)
Female -52.30*** -14.26
(12.24) (12.90)
Education: HS 30.77 24.02
(23.63) (22.50)
Education: More than HS 195.88*** 118.90***
(25.17) (24.79)
Tenure in years 1.60** 0.67
(0.66) (0.66)
Constant 430.23*** 425.80***
(152.51) (145.10)
Control for Income NO YES
Control for marital status YES YES
Control for religion YES YES
Observations 7527 7527
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Baseline category
Altruism:3, Education: Less than High school. Income is included using 10 dummies for
income categories with a range of 10,000, i.e. [0-10,000]; [10,001-20,000];
... ;[100,001 and higher].
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Table 3.4: OLS comparing public service industries with the other industries.
Dependent variable: Donations
Public Service -13.72 -1.11
(12.88) (12.34)
Altruism (1) -117.38 -83.71
(121.00) (115.66)
Altruism (2) -51.11** -54.08**
(23.04) (22.03)
Altruism (4) 32.53** 29.70**
(13.54) (12.94)
Age -17.58*** -17.29***
(3.81) (3.70)
Age*Age 0.26*** 0.24***
(0.04) (0.04)
No. of children in HH 27.05*** 18.26**
(7.63) (7.35)
Female -49.58*** -11.66
(12.04) (12.69)
Education: HS 33.83 25.61
(22.74) (21.80)
Education: More than HS 185.73*** 113.97***
(24.38) (24.19)
Tenure in years 1.47** 0.70
(0.62) (0.63)
Constant 468.98*** 476.22***
(148.71) (142.46)
Control for Income NO YES
Control for marital status YES YES
Control for religion YES YES
Observations 7348 7348
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Baseline category
Altruism:3, Education: Less than High school. Income is included using 10 dummies for
income categories with a range of 10,000, i.e. [0-10,000]; [10,001-20,000];
... ;[100,001 and higher].
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All our results so far are based on the full sample of workers. Motivated by
Lewis and Frank (2002), Buurman et al. (2012), and Dur and Zoutenbier (2015)
we replicated our results using a subsample of highly educated workers. The main
reason for this is that it might be that highly educated workers have more on-the-job
opportunities to serve the public interest than less educated workers. Our results
are in line with this. We nd that for the subsample of highly educated workers,
working in the public sector goes hand in hand with a bigger drop in charitable
donations, which remains substantial (but loses signicance) even when we control
for income.
Lastly, we examine selection into type of job. Table 3.5 reports the results of a
linear probability model similar to Dur and Zoutenbier (2015), where the dependent
variable in column 1 is employment in the public sector whereas the dependent
variable in column 2 is holding a job in health, education, or public administration.
In addition to altruism and the usual demographics, we follow Dur and Zoutenbier
by including two other self-reported preference measures: laziness and risk aversion.
In line with prediction 3, we nd in column 1 that workers with stronger altruistic
preferences are more likely to end up in the public sector, though the coe¢ cient is
marginally insignicant (p=0.104). We nd a much higher and signicant estimate
when employing the alternative denition of a public service job, see column 2. For
each point increase on the altruism scale, the likelihood of employment in health,
education, or public administration increases by 3.3 percentage points, which is
sizeable given the average likelihood of having such a job of 33.0%. These results
as well as the other coe¢ cients are well in line with Dur and Zoutenbier (2015),
who used an earlier wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel. It is worth noting
that the coe¢ cient for the workers laziness is marginally insignicant (p=0.109 and
p=0.105, respectively).
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Table 3.5: Linear probability model of selection of workers
Dependent variable: Public sector Public service
Altruism 0.015 0.033***
(0.009) (0.010)
Laziness 0.005 0.006
(0.003) (0.003)
Risk aversion 0.011*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
Age 0.007** -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Age*Age 0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Female 0.069*** 0.213***
(0.010) (0.011)
German nationality 0.082*** 0.076***
(0.026) (0.027)
No. of children in HH -0.019*** -0.007
(0.007) (0.007)
Education: HS -0.015 0.033
(0.020) (0.021)
Education: More than HS 0.205*** 0.301***
(0.021) (0.022)
Constant -0.132 0.047
(0.094) (0.099)
Control for marital status YES YES
Control for region YES YES
Observations 7470 7240
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Baseline
category Altruism:3, Education: Less than High school.
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3.5 Concluding remarks
We have studied the role of a workers altruistic preferences in occupational choice,
on-the-job e¤ort provision, and donations to charity. We developed a simple model
producing three key predictions: 1) Given job type, workers with stronger altruistic
preferences make higher donations to charity; 2) Given a workers altruism, those
working in a public service job donate less than workers in a regular job; and 3)
Workers with stronger altruistic preferences are more likely to take a public service
job. We examined data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study which con-
tains rich data on (self-reported) altruism, charitable donations, and job type and
found support for our predictions, though some results are sensitive to the exact
denition of a public service job or the estimation method. Our analysis implies
that we should be careful with using charitable donations as a proxy for altruistic
preferences in studies that compare workers in di¤erent sectors. Indeed, our the-
ory predicts and the evidence indicates that workers in public service jobs are more
altruistic, and yet make smaller donations to charity than their empirical counter-
parts in regular jobs. The reason suggested by our theory is a simple substitution
argument: Since workers in public service jobs serve the public interest on the job,
they are less inclined to make substantial charitable donations.
In our theoretical model, workers di¤ered not only in altruism, but also in their
preference for other job (dis)amenities specic to public service jobs, such as job
protection or exible working hours. In future work, we wish to study how the
provision of these (dis)amenities a¤ects the self-selection of worker types to public
service jobs. Regarding empirical work, it would be interesting to follow workers over
time, in particular when they switch job types for plausibly exogenous reasons, or
experience a change in the mission of the organization they work for (as in Zoutenbier
2016). The release of the next wave of the SOEP may provide opportunities to
do so. The lab may also provide a useful test bed for more directly testing the
substitutability between on-the-job contributions to society and charitable donations
(see e.g. Gerhards 2015, Banuri and Keefer 2016, Cassar 2016b, and Carpenter and
Gong 2016).

Chapter 4
Increasing the Well-being of
Others On-the-job and Outside
the Workplace
4.1 Introduction
Recently there has been an increase in the demand for volunteers. For example,
the refugee crisis in Europe has let charitable organizations to call for more support
in the form of donations and volunteering.1 It is important to learn what drives
peoplesgiving behavior, in order to target and attract volunteers. For instance, is
it a good idea to try and recruit people who in their day-to-day work life are involved
with helping others, or is it better to focus recruitment resources on people who lack
opportunities to help on-the-job?
In this paper we explore the relationship between workersopportunities to help
others on-the-job and volunteering behavior outside the workplace. Following Dur
and Van Lent (2016) we predict that helping people on-the-job and outside the
workplace are substitutes. If workers have more opportunities to help others in public
sector jobs than in private sector jobs, then workers who switch from the public to the
1The Red Cross in the UK has e.g. started a project which is intended to attract
volunteers especially to o¤er refugees help during the current refugee crisis in Europe (see:
http://www.redcross.org.uk/What-we-do/Refugee-support).
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private sector are expected to decrease their contributions to others on-the-job, and
hence will by a substitution argument increase their charitable contributions outside
work. Workers who switch in the opposite direction are expected to decrease their
charitable contributions. To test this prediction we estimate the e¤ect of a change
in sector of employment on volunteering using rich data from the Dutch LISS Panel.
The LISS Panel consists of approximately 8,000 individuals and covers the years
2008 to 2016. The questionnaire contains detailed questions on leisure, work, school-
ing, personality, and politics, which allow us to test our prediction. The key question
we use as a proxy for charitable behavior is "Considered all together, how much time
do you spend on voluntary work per week, on average".
Workersmotivations to switch jobs may not be exogenous to their willingness
to volunteer. For example, workers who switch from sector of employment may be
di¤erent from other workers in many aspects. Therefore in addition to our focus on
job switchers, we also analyze a plausibly exogenous change in workersability to
help others on-the-job, by studying a change in the match of mission preferences of
government workers.
Following Zoutenbier (2016), government workers are assumed to have a match
in mission preferences when they voted for one of the political parties that is in
o¢ ce. The preferences are classied as a mismatch if the worker has voted for a
political party that is not in o¢ ce. We expect that government workers who have
a mission match with their employer feel that they have more opportunities to help
others at their work than government workers who do not have a match of mission
preferences. Hence, because of a substitution argument, we predict that government
workers who share the mission of their employer volunteer less than government
workers who do not share the mission. The LISS Panel contains data covering three
government coalition periods, and hence we observe two changes in the composition
of the parties that are in o¢ ce.2 We are therefore able to rely on within worker
variation in mission preferences.
Our main ndings are the following. First, workers who switch from sector of
employment do not change their time spent on voluntary work signicantly, although
2Note that the Netherlands has a government in o¢ ce that usually consists of multiple political
parties, but an individual can vote for only one political party.
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the coe¢ cients always have the expected sign. That is, workers who switch from a
private sector job to a public sector job (insignicantly) decrease their time spent
volunteering, while workers who switch in the opposite direction (insignicanty)
increase their time spent on voluntary work. Second, we nd that government
workers who voted for one of the political parties that is in o¢ ce, and hence are
more able to help others on-the-job, decrease their volunteering by 15 minutes per
week on average which is in line with our prediction.
One obvious reason for people to volunteer is in order to help others. However,
there can be other reasons for workers to volunteer. One potentially important alter-
native motivation to volunteer is to increase job perspectives. For instance, because
a worker obtains skills through volunteering that are useful in the labor market, or
because volunteering gives the employer a positive signal about the workers per-
sonality, see for example Baert and Vuji´c (2016). One may expect the benets of
volunteering for career enhancement to be larger in the beginning of a workers ca-
reer, since in this phase other signals about the workers ability and personality are
more scarce. Hence, in order to reduce the channel of career concerns as a reason to
volunteer, we estimate our specication also for the subsample of more experienced
workers (i.e. the workers for whom we expect career perspectives to be less of a
reason to volunteer).
Using the subsample of workers that are over 40 years of age we nd signicant
and stronger e¤ects than for the full sample. These experienced workers who switch
from the private to the public sector decrease their time spent volunteering by on
average 37 minutes per week. Government workers who are over 40 years of age and
previously had a match in mission preferences, but after the national election not
anymore, increase their time spent volunteering by on average 23 minutes per week.
This paper is most closely related to Dur and Van Lent (2016). Both papers
study the relationship between workersoccupational choice, altruistic preferences,
and prosocial behavior outside the workplace. However there are also important
di¤erences between both papers. The main di¤erences are the following. This paper
explores panel data while Dur and Van Lent use cross sectional data.3 We study a
3One important advantage of panel data is that there is less of a concern for omitted variable
bias, since individual xed e¤ects control for all time invariant factors, observed and unobserved.
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sample of Dutch workers, while Dur and Van Lent study German workers. Besides
analyzing job switchers, this paper also uses a plausibly exogenous change in work-
ers ability to help others on-the-job by studying changes in the match of mission
preferences between government workers and their employer. Finally, we have rich
data on time spent volunteering, while Dur and Van Lent (2016) have richer data on
money donations to charity. Time donations are di¤erent from money donations in
several respects. On the one hand, donating time is more personal and may therefore
be more closely related to helping others on-the-job than to money donations. On
the other hand, workers may also choose to volunteer for other reasons than to help
other people, for instance in order to increase career perspectives.
Our research is also related to a body of literature that studies the relationship
between workerstime use on activities on-the-job and outside the workplace. Ex-
amples are the time spent on physically intensive work on-the-job and outside the
workplace (see e.g. Tudor-Locke et al. 2011), time spent on work in the household
and paid work (see e.g. Krantz-Kent 2009), and the e¤ect of framing compensa-
tion schemes on time spent on-the-job and volunteering (see e.g. DeVoe and Pfe¤er
2007). These papers generally nd that workerson-the-job behavior a¤ects their
behavior outside work. We contribute to this literature by studying the relation
between time spent on helping others on-the-job and outside the workplace.
This paper is also related to a body of literature in economics that studies work-
ersintrinsic motivation in the workplace. Some theory papers have studied work-
place behavior of intrinsically motivated workers, see for example Francois (2000,
2007), Besley and Ghatak (2005, 2016), Prendergast (2007), Brekke and Nyborg
(2008), and Delfgaauw and Dur (2008, 2010). An increasing number of empirical
papers have tested some of these theoretical predictions, see for example Dur and
Zoutenbier (2014, 2015), Zoutenbier (2016), and Carpenter and Gong (2016). Our
paper contributes to this literature by empirically testing the relation between work-
ersopportunities to help others on-the-job and volunteering behavior outside the
workplace.
Moreover, there is a literature in public administration that studies whether
workers in some sector or jobs are more altruistic than in others. In order to answer
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this question, researchers often study only peoples charitable behavior outside the
workplace, see for example (Brewer 2003, Houston 2006, Rotolo and Wilson 2006,
and Lee 2012). Based on our substitution argument, this analysis is awed and leads
to an underestimation of public sector workersaltruistic preferences. For a more
extensive discussion of this argument, see Dur and Van Lent (2016).
Finally, this paper is related to a literature that analysis why people with similar
characteristics and preferences have di¤erent volunteering rates. For example Hackl
et al. (2012) study the states role in inuencing workers decision to volunteer,
using data from the European Value Survey and the World Value Survey. They
nd that volunteering participation rates vary greatly across countries, even after
controlling for individual workerscharacteristics. The authors explain variation in
volunteering by di¤erences in institutional and political factors. We study whether
occupational choice leads similar people in terms of preferences to make di¤erent
volunteering decisions. However we study only workers within one country.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the data and
empirical strategy. In the third section we discuss the results, and the fourth and
nal section contains the conclusion.
4.2 Data and empirical strategy
In this paper we use data from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social
sciences (LISS) panel. The LISS panel is an unbalanced panel consisting of ap-
proximately 8,000 individuals. Participants are selected through random sampling
from the population register by Statistics Netherlands. Individuals complete online
questionnaires every month, and are paid for each completed questionnaire. The
rst wave was conducted in 2008 and the most recent wave was conducted in 2016.
The panel includes modules on Social Integration and Leisure, Work and Schooling,
Personality, and Politics and Values. Each of these modules are administered once
a year. For our analysis we use data from the years 2008 to 2015.
The key variables used for this paper are sector of employment and the number
of hours spent on voluntary work on average per week. The sector of employment is
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measured using the question: "In what type of organization do you work?" The orga-
nization types the participant could choose from are: "public or semi-public sector"
and "private company". The number of hours spent volunteering are measured by
the question: "Considered all together, how much time do you spend on voluntary
work per week, on average?".
The econometric specication that we use in order to estimate the e¤ect of a
change in job type on volunteering reads:
CHi;t = i + Pi;t +  Xi;t +  t + "i;t (4.1)
where CHi;t is charitable behavior outside the job of person i at time period t; i
is the individual xed e¤ect; Pi;t a dummy variable that equals one if a worker has
a public sector job; Xi;t is a vector of (time varying) control variables; and  t is the
time xed e¤ect. As a measure of charitable giving we use the respondentsaverage
number of hours spent volunteering per week. We estimate time volunteering using
Ordinary Least Squares with time and year xed e¤ects. A disadvantage of using
a linear specication for volunteering is that this specication can predict negative
values for the number of hours a worker volunteered. Further, this specication does
not take into account that many workers spend zero hours per week on average on
voluntary work. We have also estimated a xed e¤ects Poisson specication. A
Poisson specication deals in a better way with the large fraction of zeros in the
data, and does not allow values to be negative, but a disadvantage of this model is
that data should be discrete (i.e. the dependent variable should be count).4 These
results do not di¤er much from those estimated using OLS and are available upon
request. Since we expect that helping others on the job and outside the job are
substitutes, we predict that  < 0.
Since switching jobs is endogenous, we also analyze the e¤ect of a plausibly
exogenous change in workersability to help others on-the-job on charitable behavior
outside work. Following Zoutenbier (2016) we use changes in the composition of
the political parties that are in o¢ ce, and workerspolitical preferences in order to
4To be more precise, we estimate the Poisson specication with robust standard errors. This
relaxes the assumption that the conditional mean should equal the conditional variance.
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establish workersmission preferences. For political preferences we used the question:
"For which party did you vote in the parliamentary elections of [22 November 2006
/ 9 June 2010 / 12 September 2012]?" Participants are considered a match if the
political party they voted for in the election is in o¢ ce in that same time period.
When mission preferences match we assume that the ability of government workers
to help others is larger than for government workers whose preferences do not match.
Note that we focus here on government workers instead of all public sector workers.
The reason is that we expect that the e¤ect of the political parties in o¢ ce on the
work that people do is larger for government workers than for other public sector
workers.
In order to estimate the e¤ect of a change in mission preferences on charitable
behavior (outside the job) we estimate the following equation:
CHi;t = i + Gi;t + Mi;t + (Gi;t Mi;t) + 'Xi;t +  t + "i;t (4.2)
where Gi;t is a dummy that equals one if the worker is employed in the government
sector and zero if not employed in the government sector; Mi;t is a dummy that
equals one if the worker has voted for a political party that is in o¢ ce and zero if
the worker voted for another party. We expect that government workers who voted
for one of the political parties that are in o¢ ce believe they are better able to help
others on their job than workers with non-matching preferences. Hence because of
the substitution argument we predict that  < 0.
Table 4.1 displays the descriptive statistics. Our full sample consists of 21,395
observations of 6,573 individuals, of which 21.3% spent some time volunteering. On
average respondents volunteer 58 minutes per week, and 37.9% of the respondents
is employed in the public sector.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Total Public (37.9%) Private(62.1%)
Volunteering: mean 0.97 1.11 0.89
standard deviation 3.78 4.30 3.43
Volunteering: % 21.3% 23.8% 19.8%
Age: mean 43.00 44.97 41.80
standard deviation 12.05 11.61 12.16
Number of children: mean 1.06 1.01 1.09
standard deviation 1.14 1.15 1.14
Net income: mean 1723.85 1750.21 1707.76
standard deviation 3362.78 2987.31 3572.66
Hours at work: mean 30.22 29.20 30.85
standard deviation 14.52 13.15 15.25
Distance: mean 26.57 27.27 26.14
standard deviation 22.03 21.39 22.41
Tenure: mean 11.36 13.48 10.07
standard deviation 10.49 11.15 9.84
Observations 21395 8110 13285
Number of individuals 6573 2483 4387
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Comparing charitable behavior of workers between sectors, we see that public
sector workers on average perform more voluntary work. Further, workers in the
public sector are older, have less children, and work less hours. Since the coe¢ cient
for the public sector dummy in our specication is identied by those people who
switch from the public to the private sector or vice versa, it is interesting to learn
how often respondents switch between sectors. Of the 6,573 individuals, 463 switch
at least once from sector of employment between 2008 en 2015 (i.e. 7.0% of the
respondents in the sample).
Finally, one worry may be that workersability to change their time spent on
voluntary work is limited (e.g. because people are habitual or because many volun-
teering activities require commitment for a long time). From the data we see that
in our sample the within-worker variation of time spent volunteering is 2.23 hours,
compared to the between-worker variation of 3.94 hours. Hence, although the within-
worker variation is less than the between variation we expect that the within-worker
variation is enough to be able to expect workersjob choice and behavior to a¤ect
volunteering behavior.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Job switchers and charitable behavior
Table 4.2 shows the estimation of equation (4.1) using Ordinary Least Squares with
individual and time xed e¤ects. We cluster standard errors at the individual level
to correct for correlation of the error term for individuals over time. The rst column
displays the e¤ect of sector of employment on time spent on voluntary work without
control variables. We nd that workers who switch from the private to the public
(public to the private) sector decrease (increase) their volunteering by 9 minutes on
average per week, but this e¤ect is highly insignicant.
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Table 4.2: Fixed e¤ects Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent variable: Volunteering
Public sector -0.150 -0.128
(0.215) (0.212)
Hours at work -0.005**
(0.002)
Net income -0.000
(0.000)
Distance -0.003
(0.004)
Tenure -0.011
(0.008)
Individual and time xed e¤ects YES YES
Observations 21395 21395
Number of individuals 6573 6573
Standard errors in parenthese, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Standard errors are clustered on the individual level.
In the second column we add job characteristics that vary over time and are
expected to be important to control for.5 The job characteristics we include are
the actual average hours worked per week and the distance from home to work
in minutes, since we expect these characteristics to di¤er over time and have a
direct impact on the ability to spend time volunteering. Further, we include income
because income can be used to help others by making money donations, which
may inuence workers willingness to volunteer (see Andreoni et al. 1996, and more
recently Feldman 2010). Another reason to include income as a control variable
is because paying taxes over ones income can, by some people, also be seen as a
donation to society. Finally we include tenure on-the-job, since workers can also
switch jobs within sector, and a new work environment in itself can have an e¤ect
5Note that we only need to consider time varying variables as controls, since variables that
are time invariant are already taken up by the individual xed e¤ect, and are thereby already
controlled for. Control variables as education or marital status are also not included here, since
they hardly vary for the workers in the sample period.
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on volunteering. If we compare the rst column of Table 4.2 with the second, we see
that the additional control variables do not change the result much. The coe¢ cient
changes from -0.150 to -0.128 and remains highly insignicant. We see that most
control variables are individually insignicant, with hours at work as the exception.6
The relation between hours at work and volunteering is negative, as expected.
We can also analyze whether job choice has an e¤ect on the decision to volunteer,
i.e. the extensive instead of the intensive margin. We estimate a Binary Logit
specication, with the dependent variable equal to one if the worker has volunteered,
and equal to zero if the worker has not volunteered. We nd that there is also no
signicant e¤ect on the extensive margin. The results are available upon request.
Many empirical papers that attempt to compare jobs in which workers have
plenty of opportunities to help others with jobs that o¤er less of these opportunities
compare jobs in the public sector with jobs in the private sector. Other papers com-
pare jobs in di¤erent industries. Hence, we also estimate equation (4.1) comparing
workers in di¤erent industries. We dene a public service job (i.e. a job that of-
fers plenty of opportunities to help others) as a job in the Education, Government,
Healthcare and Welfare industry, or Environmental Services, and the other job types
as regular jobs.7 We report the results in Table 4.3. The public service dummy is
negative as predicted but again highly insignicant.
6Comparing the model with and without time varying controls we nd that the null hypothesis
that the coe¢ cients of the added control variables all equal zero is rejected.
7The remaining industries include: agriculture forestry shery hunting, mining, industrrial
production, utilities production distribution or trade, construction, retail trade, catering, transport
storage and communication, nancial, business services, environmental services, culture, and other
services.
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Table 4.3: Fixed e¤ects Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent variable: Volunteering
Public service -0.099 -0.085
(0.233) (0.229)
Hours at work -0.004*
(0.002)
Net income -0.000
(0.000)
Distance -0.004
(0.003)
Tenure -0.009
(0.006)
Individual and time xed e¤ects YES YES
Observations 22896 22896
Number of individuals 7027 7027
Standard errors in parenthese, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Standard errors are clustered on the individual level.
All the variation in the public sector dummy stems from those workers who
switch between sectors. It is not unlikely that workers who switch from the public
to the private sector (or vice versa) are inherently di¤erent from those workers that
do not switch. If this is the case it may be worthwhile to look at those workers
who switch from sector of employment at least once during the sample period. In
Table 4.4 we compare the descriptive statistics of the workers who switch at least
once, with the workers that never switch. We see that workers who switch at least
once volunteer more hours, work less hours, live further away from their job, and
have a lower income. Also more workers switch from the public sector to the private
sector than vice versa. Since workers that switch from sector of employment are
so di¤erent from those that do not switch, it may be the case that the di¤erence
in charitable behavior for switchers is now partly captured by the control variables.
If we estimate equation (4.1) for the sample of job switchers we get qualitatively
similar results as for the full sample. The results are available upon request.
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Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics
Total Switchers (7.0%)
Volunteering: mean 0.97 1.19
standard deviation 3.78 3.90
Volunteering: % 21.3% 22.2%
Age: mean 43.00 38.05
standard deviation 12.05 13.33
Number of children: mean 1.06 1.07
standard deviation 1.14 1.19
Net income: mean 1723.85 1388.26
standard deviation 3362.78 1032.66
Hours at work: mean 30.22 27.32
standard deviation 14.52 14.19
Distance: mean 26.57 28.25
standard deviation 22.03 22.89
Tenure: mean 11.36 5.85
standard deviation 10.49 7.59
Observations 21395 1735
Number of individuals 6573 463
Switching sector of employment may be endogenous to charitable giving outside
work. Workers for example can decide to switch jobs because they anticipate that
they want to help others more in the future. If this, or something else that is directly
related to charitable behavior, is the reason for a switch in sector of employment,
our results would be biased.8 In order to reduce the probability that workers switch
8But there are many other reasons why workers switch jobs that are likely to be more important
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for reasons that are related to charitable giving, we ideally want to look at people
who have to switch jobs for reasons that are exogenous to volunteering.
In the questionnaire respondents are asked whether and why they are looking for
a new job. One possible answer category is that the respondent is looking for a new
job because he or she is uncertain whether their current job will continue to exist.
Some respondents switched from sector of employment the year after they said that
they were looking for a new job because they were uncertain whether their job would
continue to exist. For those workers we are more certain that they are not switching
jobs because they want to have a better opportunity to help others. Hence we also
estimate equation (4.1) including these workers only. We nd no signicant e¤ect
of a change in sector of employment on charitable behavior. However, a reason for
the insignicant coe¢ cient may be that the sample size is too small.9
Stability of altruistic preferences
In the models we estimated so far we did not include altruism as a control variable.
The reason is that in most of the literature altruism is assumed to be an individual
characteristic that is stable over time. By using individual xed e¤ects we then
automatically control for workersaltruistic preferences. However, it may be the
case that workers altruistic preferences change after they switch from sector of
employment. For instance because workers learn in their new public sector job
that helping others is much more intrinsically rewarding than they expected and
as a consequence they become more willing to help others. Alternatively, workers
altruistic preferences change because their social environment changes (a recent eld
experiment bij Kosse et al. 2016 nds evidence that social environment has a causal
e¤ect on altruistic preferences).
In our data we have two questions that we can use to elicit workers altruis-
tic preferences, and hence we can test whether altruistic preferences change when
workers switch from sector of employment. Participants are asked to describe how
for many people. Job related reasons to switch jobs are for example the social environment (Abassi
and Hollman 2000), job-related stress (Firth et al. 2004), organizational culture (Park and Kim
2009) or compensation schemes. But also family reasons can be a reason to change jobs.
9Only 188 people switch the year after they said that there were looking for a new job because
they are uncertain whether their current job will exist in the future.
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accurately each statement describes them: "I feel little concern for others" and "I
am not interested in other peoples problems". Both questions can be answered on a
5 point scale ranging from "very inaccurate" to "very accurate". We then construct
our altruism parameter by taking the average of the answers to the two questions.
We subsequently estimate the e¤ect of a change in sector of employment on altru-
ism and do not nd any evidence that a change in sector of employment leads to a
change in altruistic preferences (see Appendix 4.A.1).
Volunteering and career concerns
One obvious reason for people to volunteer is in order to help others. However, there
can be many reasons for people to volunteer. One potentially important alternative
motivation for people to volunteer is to increase their career perspectives. For in-
stance, by volunteering one may obtain skills that are relevant for the labor market,
or one may be able to signal something about his or her personality that is valued
by potential employers. Baert and Vuji´c (2016) nd using a eld experiment that
volunteering has a positive e¤ect on the probability to be invited for a job inter-
view. One may expect that some of the positive e¤ects of volunteering for the labor
market are of particular importance at the beginning of ones career.10 Therefore,
we expect that older workers volunteer less for career enhancement. Hence, in order
to be able to better estimate the substitutability between helping others on-the-job
and outside the job through volunteering, we next estimate equation (4.1) for older
workers only. To be precise, we estimate equation (4.1) for workers who are over 40
years old. In Table 4.5 we report the results of the more experienced workers. We
see that more experienced workers who switch to the public sector decrease their
time spent volunteering by 37 minutes on average per week. In column two we see
that this result is robust for adding the time varying control variables.
10For example, volunteering can provide a signal about the workers personality. This signal is
likely to be more informative in the beginning of the workers career when information about the
workers personality is more scarce.
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Table 4.5: Fixed e¤ects Ordinary Least Squares, sample: age>40
Dependent variable: Volunteering
Public sector -0.611* -0.620*
(0.326) (0.324)
Hours at work -0.009**
(0.004)
Net income -0.000
(0.000)
Distance -0.002
(0.006)
Tenure -0.016*
(0.009)
Individual and time xed e¤ects YES YES
Observations 12541 12541
Number of individuals 3606 3606
Standard errors in parenthese, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Standard errors are clustered on the individual level.
Highly educated job switchers
Previous research (see e.g. Lewis and Frank 2002 and Dur and Zoutenbier 2014,
2015) has found that more altruistic workers select into public sector jobs, and
that these patterns are stronger for the sample of workers that is highly educated.
One interpretation of this nding is that in the public sector especially the highly
educated are able to help others on-the-job and therefore the selection pattern is
stronger for highly educated workers. If the di¤erence in the opportunity to help
others on-the-job between the public and private sector is larger for highly educated,
then this would, following our substitution argument also imply that the di¤erence
in volunteering would be larger. In Table 4.6 we estimate equation (4.1) for the
subsample of highly educated workers.11 We nd that the public sector dummy is
11We dene workers as highly educated if they have either completed a degree in higher voca-
tional training or have (at least) an undergraduate degree at a university.
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again negative, but not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
Table 4.6: Fixed e¤ects Ordinary Least Squares, sample: Highly educated
Dependent variable: Volunteering
Public sector -0.055 -0.036
(0.324) (0.328)
Hours at work 0.000
(0.003)
Net income 0.000
(0.000)
Distance -0.004
(0.003)
Tenure 0.001
(0.013)
Individual and time xed e¤ects YES YES
Observations 6878 6878
Number of individuals 2316 2316
Standard errors in parenthese, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Standard errors are clustered on the individual level.
4.3.2 Match of mission preferences and charitable behavior
So far we have focused on analyzing the relationship between helping others on-the-
job and outside the workplace, using job switchers. Since switching from sector of
employment is endogenous, we now provide an alternative for identifying a change
in the ability to help others on-the-job by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation
in opportunities to help others on the current job.
Zoutenbier (2016) analyzed using the same data (but exploiting a smaller time
span), the e¤ect of a (mis)match of mission preferences on job satisfaction for gov-
ernment workers. He denes workers to have a mission match when they voted for
a political party that is in o¢ ce. He then exploits the fact that the composition of
the government changes over time, and hence whether government workers have a
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match with the mission of the government also changes over time. Zoutenbier nds
that government workers who voted for a coalition party are more satised with the
type of work they do.
If we assume that government workers believe they are better able to help others
when the organizations preferences are in line with the workers preferences, we can
use changes in the match of mission preferences. Using the substitution argument,
we predict that government workers who voted for a political party that is in o¢ ce,
are better able to help others on-the-job and as a consequence they will volunteer
less.
In order to test this prediction we estimate equation (4.2) and report the results
of the full sample in Table 4.7. In column 1 we see the e¤ect of a match of mission
preferences with the coalition of government workers and non-government workers.
We see that government workers who voted for one of the political parties that is
in o¢ ce (i.e. workers with a match in mission preferences) volunteer on average 15
minutes less per week. When including the time varying control variables in column
2, we nd that the results hardly change.
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Table 4.7: Fixed e¤ects Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent variable: Volunteering
Government 0.209 0.218
(0.262) (0.267)
Match 0.079 0.077
(0.070) (0.070)
Government*Match -0.249* -0.247*
(0.136) (0.136)
Hours at work -0.005**
(0.002)
Net income -0.000
(0.000)
Distance -0.002
(0.004)
Tenure -0.008
(0.008)
Individual and time xed e¤ects YES YES
Observations 16504 16504
Number of individuals 5382 5382
Standard errors in parenthese, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Standard errors are clustered on the individual level.
Since in the Netherlands the government in our sample period always consisted
of multiple political parties, we estimate a match of mission preferences using alter-
native denitions for robustness. Following Zoutenbier (2016) we create a dummy
that equals one only if the worker voted for the largest political party in government,
and we use the workersstance toward all political parties. By doing this we see
that the coe¢ cient of interest oftentimes becomes statistically insignicant.
Using the same arguments as before, we expect the e¤ects to be stronger for more
experienced workers (see Table 4.8) and for highly educated workers (see Table 4.9).
We nd that indeed the e¤ects are larger for the sample of workers that is at least
40 years old. To be precise government workers who previously had a match in
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mission preferences, but after election not anymore, increase their volunteering with
on average 23 minutes per week. For the subsample of highly educated workers we
nd a similar increase in the size of the coe¢ cient, although the coe¢ cient becomes
insignicant.
Table 4.8: Fixed e¤ects Ordinary Least Squares, sample: age>40
Dependent variable: Volunteering
Government 0.037 0.033
(0.502) (0.511)
Match 0.101 0.100
(0.096) (0.095)
Government*Match -0.381** -0.382**
(0.172) (0.173)
Hours at work -0.006*
(0.003)
Net income -0.000
(0.000)
Distance -0.003
(0.007)
Tenure -0.010
(0.009)
Individual and time xed e¤ects YES YES
Observations 10752 10752
Number of individuals 3331 3331
Standard errors in parenthese, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Standard errors are clustered on the individual level.
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Table 4.9: Fixed e¤ects Ordinary Least Squares, sample: Highly educated
Dependent variable: Volunteering
Government 0.564 0.570
(0.444) (0.441)
Match 0.119 0.119
(0.110) (0.110)
Government*Match -0.377 -0.379
(0.235) (0.235)
Hours at work -0.002
(0.004)
Net income 0.000
(0.000)
Distance -0.003
(0.003)
Tenure -0.004
(0.011)
Individual and time xed e¤ects YES YES
Observations 6235 6235
Number of individuals 2133 2133
Standard errors in parenthese, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Standard errors are clustered on the individual level.
4.4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we studied the relationship between workersprosocial behavior on-
the-job and outside the workplace. We predict that there is substitutability between
workersopportunities to help others on-the-job and volunteering outside the work-
place. Using rich panel data from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social
Sciences (LISS) we test this prediction in two distinct ways. First, we compare vol-
unteering behavior of workers who switch between public sector and private sector
jobs. This stems from the assumption that workers in the public sector often have
plenty of opportunity to help others on-the-job, while for workers in the private sec-
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tor the opportunities to help others are more scarce. Second, we analyze the change
in match of mission preferences of government workers on volunteering behavior.
Government workers are considered a match if they voted for one of the political
parties that is in the coalition government. Using the variation in political parties
that are in the coalition government over time, government workers switch from a
match to a mismatch in preferences and vice versa. We predict that government
workers who voted for one of the political parties that is in o¢ ce, feel that they have
plenty of opportunties to help others on-the-job, and hence they will volunteer less.
We nd some support for our prediction. We nd that workers who switch from
a public to a private sector job (or vice versa) do not signicantly change their vol-
unteering behavior. However, we do nd results that are in line with our prediction
when we focus on changes in the match of mission preferences for government work-
ers. We nd that government workers with a mission that matches their employers
mission, volunteer on average 15 minutes less per week. Besides volunteering for
the purpose of helping others, workers can also volunteer for career concerns. Since
we expect the e¤ect of volunteering on career perspectives to be larger for young
workers, we also focus on the subsample of older workers. We indeed nd stronger
e¤ects for older workers, suggesting that some of the young workers volunteer for
career enhancement.
The fact that we nd that there is some substitutability between opportunities
to help other people on-the-job and volunteering implies that job design can lead
to crowding out (and crowding in) of charitable behavior. This is something that
policy makers and socially responsbile organizations should take into account when
designing jobs.
There can be many reasons why we do not nd stronger support for our predic-
tions. One reason can be that helping others on-the-job is not a (strong) substitute
for volunteering outside the workplace in cases where the beneciaries of the help
on-the-job and outside the job are a very di¤erent type or group of people.
In this paper we rely on job switchers in order to estimate the relationship be-
tween helping others on-the-job and outside work. There are many reasons for
workers to switch jobs, some of them may be directly related to the willingness to
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do good on-the-job, this may bias the results. Hence a cleaner way to estimate the
e¤ect of a job switch on workerswillingness to help others outside work, would be
if the decision to switch is entirely exogenous to workerswillingness and ability to
help others.
The ideal setting to test our hypothesis would therefore be, to have randomly
assigned workers change jobs and estimate their charitable behavior before and after
the job switch. It is o¤ course very unlikely that such an experiment can take place.
A more plausible alternative would be to exploit exogenous variation created from
closure of a large workplace. If there would be a rm that is closed and the employer
is obliged to nd a new employer for its employees, we could test our predictions.
We would compare workerscharitable behavior outside the job before and after the
plant closure. Also here two issues arise. First, the change in job type or tasks
should be large enough (i.e. the di¤erence in opportunities to help others on-the-
job should be su¢ ciently large). Second, workers can still self-select into other jobs
instead of working for the proposed new employer. This would again result in a
non-random subsample of workers that can be studied. Hence, unless the above
issues are properly dealed with, this type of exogeneous variation is not obviously
better than our approach.
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4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Appendix
Table 4.A.1: Fixed e¤ects Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent variable: Altruistic preferences
Public sector -0.039 -0.043
(0.047) (0.047)
Hours at work 0.001
(0.001)
Net income 0.000
(0.000)
Distance 0.000
(0.001)
Tenure -0.001
(0.002)
Individual and time xed e¤ects YES YES
Observations 14305 14305
Number of individuals 5931 5931
Standard errors in parenthese, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Standard errors are clustered on the individual level.
Chapter 5
Summary and Directions for
Further Research
In this thesis I have studied intrinsic motivation of students and workers. In chapter
two I studied whether and how goal setting can be used in order to increase student
performance. In chapter three and four I explored the relationship between work-
ersaltruistic preferences, their occupational choice, and their charitable behavior.
Next I will summarize the main ndings in the following section, followed by some
directions for further research in the last section.
5.1 Summary
In chapter two we studied the e¤ects of motivating students to set goals on study
performance. We were interested to learn whether motivating students to set goals
can increase their study performance, and whether challenging students to be more
ambitious by motivating them to set more di¢ cult goals, can increase study per-
formance further. In order to test our predictions we conducted a eld experiment
involving 1092 rst-year economics students from Erasmus University Rotterdam.
We ran our experiment during the second of three individual meetings between
students and their mentor (who is a senior student). In one treatment (goal treat-
ment) we instructed mentors to ask their students whether they had a specic grade
goal in mind for the main course they participated in at that moment, and if not,
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whether they wanted to set a grade goal. In another treatment (raise treatment)
mentors received identical instructions as in the goal treatment, but were in addi-
tion instructed to encourage students to raise their goal if deemed appropriate. We
subsequently measured performance using the grades the student obtained for the
course.
We found that motivating students to set goals increases their performance signif-
icantly. This e¤ect is mainly driven by students in the goal treatment dropping out
less often as compared to students in the control group. Students whose mentor was
instructed to also motivate students to raise their goal do not perform signicantly
di¤erent from the control group. There are several potential explanations for why
challenging students to set more ambitious goals impacts performance negatively.
First, the revised goal that the mentor proposes may be too di¢ cult. Goals that are
too di¢ cult may be impossible to reach for the student, and hence the student gives
up, leading to a performance similar to the control group where students were not
motivated to set goals. An alternative explanation is that the proposal to raise the
goal may lead to a decrease in motivation to reach the goal, and therefore students
performance decreased. This is in line with the psychology literature that nds that
often people are more motivated to reach self-set goals than goals that are set by
others or are set in cooperation. Finally, being asked to raise the goal leads to a sig-
nicant drop in performance as compared to similar students in the goal treatment
that would have been asked to raise the goal if they would have been assigned to
the raise treatment.
In chapter three we studied the role of altruistic preferences in job choice, on-
the-job e¤ort provision, and charitable donations. We developed a simple theoretical
model. In our model people di¤er in their altruistic preferences and can serve the
public interest in two ways: they can make charitable donations, and they can
decide whether to take a public service job and exert e¤ort on the job. People make
three decisions: rst they decide whether to take a public service job or a regular
job, next they decide how much e¤ort to exert at work, and how much of their
income to donate to charity. Our theory predicts that (i) the likelihood of having a
public service job (weakly) increases in a workers altruism, that (ii) for a given job
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type, charitable donations (weakly) increase in workersaltruism, and that (iii) for
a given altruism and income, workers holding a regular job donate more to charity
than workers holding a public service job. The intuition for the third prediction
stems from the fact that public service workers already contribute to the well-being
of others by exerting e¤ort on the job and, hence, by a substitution argument, they
donate less.
We empirically tested our predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel Study (SOEP). Consistent with our theory, we nd that workers who are more
altruistic are more likely to take a public service job and, for a given job type, donate
more money to charity. Furthermore, we nd that workers in a regular job make
signicantly higher donations to charity than equally altruistic workers in a public
service job. However, when we control for workers income, this di¤erence moves
close to zero.
The fourth chapter builds on the third chapter. In the fourth chapter I further
explore the relationship between workersaltruistic preferences, workersopportuni-
ties to help others on the job and outside the workplace in the form of voluteering.
Based on the theoretical framework developed in Dur and Van Lent (2016), (i.e.
based on the third chapter), I predict that helping people on-the-job and volun-
teering time outside the workplace are substitutes. I examine this prediction using
rich panel data from the Dutch LISS Panel. I exploit two sources of variation in
workersopportunities to help others on the job over time and measure the e¤ects of
these changes on volunteering behavior. The rst source of variation was a change
in the sector of employment. The second source of variation was a change in the al-
lignment of mission preferences between government workersand their employer. I
classify mission preferences to be alligned for government workers who voted for one
of the political parties that was in the coalition government in the period following
a national election. I nd some evidence for our prediction.
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5.2 Further research
In chapter two we studied the e¤ects of motivating students to set grade goals on
study performance. One interesting direction for further research is to study the
e¤ects of non-grade goals on study performance. Clark et al. (2016) already took a
step in this direction by motivating students to set goals with respect to an input,
in their case the number of online practice exams that a student wants to complete.
An interesting alternative are goals that relate to the level of understanding of the
course. These goals are more di¢ cult to measure, but the motivation to reach these
goals may be higher.
To our surprise we found that a proposal to increase the di¢ culty of the goal
that the student has set (insignicantly) decreases performance as compared to the
control group. A potential explanation for this nding is that studentsmotivation
to reach their goal has decreased because of the proposal to raise the goal. One
interesting direction for further research is to study how revising a goal a¤ects the
motivation to reach the goal. Current work in progress by myself addresses this
question from one angle. Using a series of surveys I motivate students in the rst
survey to set goals and ask them how motivated they are to reach their goals. A
randomly selected group of students are explicitly o¤ered the opportunity to revise
their goals during the second of three surveys, while others are not. In the second
and third survey I then ask all students how motivated they are to reach their goals.
This allows me to see how goal motivation changes when students change their
self-set goals.
In chapter three we studied the relation between workersaltruistic preferences,
their occupational choice, and their opportunities to help others on-the-job and
outside the workplace. In our theoretical model workers di¤ered in two respects,
their altruistic preferences and their preferences for other job (dis)amenities specic
to public service jobs, such as job protection or exible work hours. In future work
it would be interesting to study how these job (dis)amenities a¤ect workersself-
selection and work incentives.
Samenvatting en suggesties voor
vervolgonderzoek (Summary in
Dutch)
In dit proefschrift heb ik intrinsieke motivatie van studenten en werknemers bestudeerd.
In hoofdstuk twee heb ik bestudeerd of en hoe het zetten van doelen gebruikt kan
worden om studieprestaties van studenten te verbeteren. In hoofdstuk drie en vier
heb ik de relatie tussen werknemers hun altruïstische voorkeuren, baankeuze, en lief-
dadigheidsgedrag onderzocht. Nu zal ik de voornaamste bevindingen samenvatten,
gevolgd door een aantal suggesties voor vervolgonderzoek.
Samenvatting
In hoofdstuk twee bestudeerden we de e¤ecten van het motiveren van studenten
om doelen te zetten op hun studieprestaties. We waren geïnteresseerd of studenten
motiveren om doelen te zetten studieprestaties kan verbeteren, en of het uitda-
gen van studenten om ambitieuzer te zijn door het stellen van moeilijkere doelen,
studieprestaties verder kan verbeteren. Om onze predicties te testen hebben we
een veldexperiment uitgevoerd onder 1092 eerstejaars economie studenten van de
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam.
We hebben ons experiment geïmplementeerd gedurende de tweede van drie in-
dividuele gesprekken tussen studenten en hun mentor (mentoren zijn ouderejaars
studenten). In één treatment (goal treatment) hebben we mentoren geïnstrueerd om
hun studenten te vragen of ze een speciek cijferdoel in gedachten hadden voor het
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belangrijkste vak wat ze op dat moment volgden, en als ze geen doel in gedachten
hadden, of ze een doel wilden zetten. In een andere treatment (raise treatment)
kregen mentoren dezelfde instructie als in de goal treatment, maar werden ze ook
geïnstrueerd om studenten aan te moedigen om hun doel te verhogen als ze dat
gepast vonden. Vervolgens hebben we de prestaties gemeten door te kijken naar de
cijfers die de studenten voor het vak behaald hebben.
We hebben gevonden dat studenten motiveren om doelen te zetten resulteert
in betere studieprestaties. Dit resultaat wordt voornamelijk veroorzaakt doordat
studenten in de goal treatment minder vaak uitvallen dan studenten in de controle
groep. Studenten wiens mentor geïnstrueerd was om studenten ook te motiveren om
hun doel te verhogen presteren niet signicant anders dan studenten in de controle
groep. Er zijn meerdere potentiële verklaringen voor de bevinding dat studenten
uitdagen om moeilijkere doelen te zetten een negatief e¤ect heeft op prestaties.
Ten eerste, het nieuwe doel dat de mentor voorstelt kan te hoog zijn. Doelen die
te hoog zijn kunnen onhaalbaar zijn voor de student, en daarom geven studenten
op, wat leidt tot een prestatie die vergelijkbaar is met de prestaties in de controle
groep. Een alternatieve verklaring is dat het voorstel om het doel te verhogen leidt
tot een daling in de motivatie om het doel te halen, en daardoor tot een slechtere
studieprestatie. Dit is in lijn met literatuur in de psychologie. Deze literatuur laat
zien dat mensen vaak gemotiveerder zijn om doelen te halen die ze zelf hebben gezet
dan om doelen te halen die anderen voor ze hebben gezet. Tot slot, gevraagd worden
om het doel te verhogen in de raise treatment leidt tot een signicante afname in
prestaties vergeleken met vergelijkbare studenten in de goal treatment.
In hoofdstuk drie hebben we de rol bestudeerd die altruïstische preferenties spelen
in baankeuze, inspanningen op het werk, en donaties aan liefdadigheidsorganisaties.
We hebben eerst een theoretisch model ontwikkeld. In ons model verschillen mensen
in hun altruïstische preferenties en kunnen ze anderen helpen op twee manieren:
door het doneren aan een goed doel en door het nemen van een publieke service
baan. Mensen maken drie beslissingen: ze kiezen een publieke servicebaan of een
reguliere baan, ze kiezen hoeveel inspanning ze leveren in hun baan, en hoeveel geld
ze doneren aan liefdadigheidsorganisaties. Onze theorie voorspelt dat (i) de kans dat
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iemand een publieke servicebaan neemt stijgt in zijn/haar altruïstische preferenties,
dat (ii) voor een gegeven baan type, donaties aan goede doelen stijgen met mensen
hun altruïsme, en dat (iii) voor een gegeven altruïsme en inkomen, mensen die een
reguliere baan hebben meer doneren aan goede doelen dan mensen die een publieke
servicebaan hebben. De intuïtie achter de derde predictie is dat mensen met een
publieke servicebaan al bijdragen aan het welzijn van anderen door inspanningen
te doen in hun baan, en door substitutie, zullen ze daarom minder doneren.
We hebben vervolgens onze predicties empirisch getest door gebruik te maken
van data van de German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). In lijn met onze
theorie vinden we dat werknemers die altruïstischer zijn een grotere kans hebben
om een publieke servicebaan te hebben, en gegeven hun baan, meer doneren aan
goede doelen. Verder vinden we dat werknemers met een reguliere baan signicant
meer doneren aan goede doelen in vergelijking met mensen die even altruïstisch zijn
maar een publieke servicebaan hebben, alhoewel dit verschil insignicant wordt
wanneer we ook controleren voor inkomen.
Het vierde hoofdstuk bouwt voort op het derde hoofdstuk. In het vierde hoofd-
stuk onderzoek ik verder de relatie tussen werknemersaltruïstische voorkeuren, hun
mogelijkheden om anderen te helpen in hun baan, en daarbuiten in de vorm van vri-
jwilligerswerk. Gebaseerd op het theoretische model ontwikkeld in Dur en Van Lent
(2016) voorspel ik dat mensen helpen binnen de baan en buiten de werkvloer, in
de vorm van vrijwilligerswerk, substituten zijn. Ik onderzocht deze predictie door
gebruik te maken van data van het Nederlandse LISS Panel. Ik heb hiervoor ge-
bruik gemaakt van twee bronnen van variatie in werknemers hun mogelijkheden om
anderen te helpen binnen hun baan door de tijd en het e¤ect hiervan gemeten op
de tijd die mensen spenderen aan vrijwilligerswerk. De eerste bron van variatie was
een verandering in de sector waarin iemand werkt. De tweede bron van variatie
is een verandering in de match van missie preferenties tussen bureaucraten en hun
werkgever. Als een bureaucraat gestemd heeft op één van de politieke partijen die
in de regering komt, dan classiceer ik de bureaucraat als iemand met een match in
missie preferenties met zijn of haar werkgever. Ik vind enig bewijs voor de predictie
die ik getest hebben.
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Suggestie voor vervolgonderzoek
In hoofdstuk twee hebben we het e¤ect van het motiveren van studenten om ci-
jferdoelen te zetten op studieprestaties bestudeerd. Een interessante richting voor
vervolgonderzoek is om de e¤ecten van niet-cijfermatige doelen op studieprestaties
te meten. Clark et al. (2016) hebben al een stap in deze richting gezet door studen-
ten te motiveren om doelen te zetten met betrekking tot een input, om precies te
zijn, het aantal online oefententamens dat een student wil maken. Een interessant
alternatief zijn doelen die gerelateerd zijn aan het niveau waarop de student het
studiemateriaal beheerst. Deze doelen zijn moeilijker te meten, maar de motivatie
om deze doelen te halen kan hoger zijn.
Tot onze verrassing vonden we dat een voorstel om de moeilijkheidsgraad van het
doel te verhogen leidt tot (insignicant) lagere prestaties als in de controle groep.
Een potentiële verklaring voor deze bevinding is dat de motivatie van studenten om
hun doel te behalen is verlaagd door het voorstel om het doel te verhogen. Een
interessante richting voor vervolgonderzoek is om te bestuderen hoe het veranderen
van een doel de motivatie om het doel te bereiken verandert. Lopend onderzoek van
mijzelf onderzoekt dit vraagstuk vanuit één mogelijke invalshoek. Door gebruik te
maken van een serie vragenlijsten motiveer ik een deel van de studenten om doelen
te zetten. Een willekeurig geselecteerd deel van de studenten geef ik expliciet de
mogelijkheid om hun doelen aan te passen tijdens de tweede van drie vragenlijsten.
In de tweede en derde vragenlijst vraag ik studenten vervolgens hoe gemotiveerd ze
zijn om hun doel te behalen. Dit stelt me in staat om te analyseren hoe de motivatie
om doelen te behalen verandert wanneer studenten hun doelen aanpassen.
In hoofdstuk drie bestudeerden we de relatie tussen werknemers hun altruïstis-
che voorkeuren, hun baankeuze, en hun mogelijkheden om andere te helpen bin-
nen en buiten hun baan. In ons theoretische model verschilden werknemers op
twee manieren, ze verschilden in hun altruïstische preferenties en in hun prefer-
enties voor baanvoorzieningen die speciek zijn voor publieke servicebanen, zoals
baanbescherming of exibele werktijden. Het is interessant om verder te onderzoeken
hoe deze baanvoorzieningen werknemers hun selectie naar baantypes en werkprikkels
beïnvloed.
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